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INTRODUCTION

Although many of New Jersey's commercial transaction attorneys may use the ABA Accord' as a reference tool, it is apparent
that the ABA Accord has not been adopted universally in New
Jersey's opinion letter practice. 2 As a result, there is a great need
for standardization of opinions and their interpretation as well as a
need for generally accepted due diligence procedures for commercial loan transactions in New Jersey.
Lawyers should not request legal opinions from borrowers'
legal counsel 3 to obtain an additional potential guarantor of the
1 Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord of the
Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 Bus. LAw. 167 (1991) [hereinafter ABA Accord].
2 The author is aware of only one NewJersey based law firm and one Philadelphia
based law firm with offices in New Jersey that have adopted the ABA Accord for all of
its opinion letters.
3 Although loan documents are typically prepared either by the lender or the
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loan.4 Rather, opinion letters given in connection with commercial loan transactions should perform two primary functions. 5 Fundamentally, opinion letters insure that the lender conducted a
certain level of due diligence investigation in connection with the
transaction to confirm certain basic assumptions made by the
lender in evaluating the credit risks undertaken in the transaction. 6
Secondarily, opinion letters act as a tool to assist the lender in evaluating the unforeseen credit risks that may arise from legal peculiarities involved with the transaction.7
There is a surprising absence of authority addressing the peculiarities of NewJersey law with respect to commercial opinion letter
practice in New Jersey. This article attempts to address issues specific to New Jersey law. Although this article is not intended to
establish a standard form of opinion letter, it is designed to help
New Jersey lawyers and commercial lenders understand the issues,
risks and technical difficulties of giving certain opinions. Attorneys
and commercial lenders may use this article as a tool to evaluate
lender's counsel, the practice of borrower's counsel rendering legal opinions in commercial loan transactions is customary in NewJersey. One reason asserted in support
of such a practice is that, due to the attorney-client relationship between the borrower
and the borrower's counsel, the borrower is more likely to openly provide its counsel
with information which would not otherwise be available to the lender or its counsel.
Report Regarding Legal Opinions in PersonalProperty Secured Transactions, 44 Bus. LAw.
791, 793-4 (1989) [hereinafter California Secured Transactions Report].
4 A premise of the ABA Accord is that third-party legal opinions are intended as
an expression of professional judgment and not as a guaranty of the outcome of legal
disputes arising in connection with a particular transaction. ABA Accord, supranote 1,
at 171. See also Scorr FITZGIBBON & DONALD W. GLAZER, LEGAL OPINIONS 8-9 (1992)
[hereinafter LEGAL OPINIONS]. The guidelines to the ABA Accord have clearly stated
that any opinion request that has the effect of making the opinion more than an
expression of professional judgment is inappropriate. ABA Accord, supra note 1, at
227.
5 There are, of course, many other collateral benefits of receiving a legal opinion
in connection with a commercial loan transaction. One such benefit is that it provides the lender with a basis to estop the borrower from taking certain legal positions
contrary to the lender in any subsequent dispute arising out of the transaction. LEGAL
OPINIONS, supra note 4, at 7-8; California Secured TransactionsReport, supra note 3, at
794. In addition, legal opinions evidence that not only the loan officer of the lender,
but also the officers and directors of the borrower, have exercised reasonable care
and have acted in good faith in entering into the transaction. LEGAL OPINIONS, supra
note 4, at 8; 1989 Report of the Committee on Corporationsof the Business Law Section of the
State Bar of California Regarding Legal Opinions in Business Transactions, 45 Bus. LAw.
2169, 2174 (1990) [hereinafter California Report].
6 See ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 227 ("The proper purpose of a third-party legal
opinion is to assist in the Opinion Recipient's due diligence.").
7 See generally LEGAL OPINIONS, supranote 4, at 6-7 (legal opinions confirm that the
"basic elements of the transaction are what everyone expects them to be"); California
Report, supranote 5, at 2173 (one purpose of legal opinions is to "caution the recipient
that there are certain legal risks in proceeding with the transaction").
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whether certain opinions are necessary in connection with specific
transactions. In particular, it suggests and analyzes many commonly negotiated exceptions to opinions under New Jersey law.
This article reviews the laws of other jurisdictions only where
there is no New Jersey law on point or where they may be helpful
either in interpreting New Jersey law or in identifying trends that
New Jersey courts are likely to follow. This article is not intended
to serve as a replacement for careful research and draftsmanship, 8
but rather, as a starting point to aid both the business person and
the lawyer in identifying the laws and the issues related to the commercial loan opinion letter in New Jersey.
Throughout this article, distinctions will be drawn between
opinions given in connection with "mid-market" transactions and
those given in "high-end" transactions. "Mid-market" transactions
are those involving loans in the $500,000 to $15,000,000 range.
"High-end" transactions, on the other hand, are those involving
amounts in excess of $15,000,000.
While the specific nature of a loan will determine whether certain opinions are necessary or desirable, there is at least one inherent difference between mid-market and high-end transactions
which justifies different treatment of opinion letters given in connection with high-end transactions. By virtue of the dollar amount
of the loan, the lender often anticipates either selling participations or transferring the loan to other lenders. Thus, in a high-end
transaction, the opinion letter serves in many respects as a marketing tool by which a lender can sell part of its portfolio.9
The first part of this article discusses what is commonly referred to as the "remedies" opinion and identifies various formulations of the opinion. It analyzes several exceptions and limitations
used in the opinion by New Jersey practitioners. These exceptions
and limitations are based upon NewJersey law which limits the enforceability of certain provisions customarily found in commercial
loan documents.
The second part of this article identifies other opinions which
8 A premise of the ABA Accord was that it did not replace "careful, knowledgeable, transaction-specific legal work" as the foundation for an opinion. ABA Accord,
supra note 1, at 171.
9 The ABA Accord acknowledges that opinion letters are customarily provided to
lending institutions in the course of deciding whether to purchase a participation
interest in a loan. ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 217-18. Opining counsel will customarily include express provisions in their opinions limiting the parties who may rely on
the opinion. LEGAL OPINIONS, supra note 4, at 26. It is generally accepted that such
limitations should limit the liability of the opining counsel. Id. at 26-28.
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are often requested in connection with asset-based secured transactions in NewJersey. It sets forth and analyzes the numerous exceptions and limitations which are included in such opinions.
II.

A.

THE REMEDIES OPINION

Formulation, Meaning & Scope.

The most commonly accepted formulation of the remedies
opinion is that "the agreement is valid, binding and enforceable
against the borrower in accordance with its terms." 10 This opinion
can be construed in two different ways. The first approach is that
each provision of each agreement to which the opinion relates may
be enforced against the borrower exactly as it is written. This is the
view taken by most New York practitioners" and adopted in the
ABA Accord. l" The second approach is to infer that the recipient
of the opinion understands that while each provision of the agreement may not be enforceable exactly as written, the provisions of
the agreement are generally enforceable in some respect.1 3 Under
the second approach, the opinion-giver assumes that the scope of
the opinion is limited not only to those laws which are customarily
and primarily applicable to the type of transaction involved, but
also to those laws which would potentially result in the unenforceability of either the transaction, taken as a whole, or some fundamental aspect of the transaction.
Under the first approach, the opining attorney is faced with
the substantial task of reviewing the agreement to determine
whether the lender would be successful in any suit brought by the
lender against the borrower to enforce any particular provision of
the agreement. 4 It is necessary to have an intimate knowledge of
virtually all state and federal statutes, regulations and case law
which may affect the lender's ability to specifically enforce each
10 ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 199.
11 Special Report by the Tribar Opinion Committee: The Remedies Opinion, 46 Bus. LAw.
959, 961 (1991) [hereinafter Tribar Remedies Report]. In fact, this has been the ac-

cepted New York approach since 1979. Report by Special Committee on Legal Opinions in
Commerical Transactions,Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An EasierPath, 34 Bus. LAw.
1891, 1915 (1979) [hereinafter TriBar Report].
12 ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 198-201.
13 It should be noted that the second approach has not been formally adopted by
any organized or identifiable group in NewJersey, but is, nonetheless, an approach to
drafting opinion letters which is often used by New Jersey practitioners. This ap-

proach has been recognized in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., California Report, supra

note 5, at 2210.
14 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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provision of the .agreement.15 To the extent that the opinion-giver
does not intend to review certain law which may arguably be related to the transaction or the opinion giver's client, an exception
16
must be expressly stated in the opinion.
Under either of these approaches, it is important to note that
the opining attorney is responsible for the public policy applicable
to the agreement.' 7 If the applicable jurisdiction has enunciated a
public policy contrary to any particular provision of the agreement,
the opining attorney must disclose that such provision may violate
public policy.
While either approach is reasonable and defensible, the attorney subscribing to the second approach runs the risk that the opinion recipient is relying on him to identify all defects in the
transaction. 18 In the event that the enforceability of any one of the
provisions of the agreement is ultimately determined to be limited,
the opinion giver may be liable to the recipient for any damages

15 Although on its face it would appear to cover all laws, even under the New York
approach, the remedies opinion is deemed to cover only laws that would ordinarly
apply to the transaction or the opining counsel's client. Tribar Remedies Report, supra
note 11, at 966. For remedies opinions rendered in connection with loan transactions, the New York approach would generally exclude from coverage the Securities
Act of 1933, the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Federal
Reserve Board margin regulations, regulatory statutues applicable solely to the recipient, the New Jersey Industrial Site Recovery Act (formerly the New Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act), and antitrust laws generally. Id. at 967-969.
Similarly, the ABA Accord enumerates a list of various statutes and general bodies of
law that are implicitly excluded from the scope of an opinion adopting the ABA Accord. ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 215-17.
16 The ABA Accord provides that law not expressly included in the scope of the
opinion is implicitly excluded from the opinion. ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 182.
However, the ABA Accord also provides that Federal law is not covered by the opinion
unless expressly stated. Id. This is divergent from the New York approach which
would deem all laws normally related to the transaction or the opinion-giver's client
to be covered. TribarRemedies Report, supra note 11, at 966.
17 LEGAL OPINIONS, supra note 4, at 208; Report of the State Bar of Arizona Corporate,
Banking, and Business Law Section Subcommittee on Rendering Legal Opinions in Business
Transactions, 21 A1uz. ST. L.J. 563, 591 (1989) [hereinafter Arizona Report]; Report on
Legal Opinions To Third Partiesin CorporateTransactions, reprinted in Legal Opinions App.
13:107, §10.04B [hereinafter Georgia Report].
18 See infra note 138, regarding Arab African InternationalBank v. Epstein, where the
court denied recovery to an opinion recipient on the basis that it was not duly qualified as a foreign bank and was therefore barred from using the New Jersey courts in
connection with causes of action arising out of transactions that occurred during the
period that the opinion recipient was not duly qualified. Arab African Int'l Bank v.
Epstein, No. 90-2461, 1992 WL 184362 (D.N.J. July 21, 1992). The court did not address the issue of whether the opinion giver could have been liable for failing to
address the New Jersey foreign banking laws in its opinion letter.
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arising out of the recipient's reliance on the opinion."l Therefore,
the more conservative course for the opinion giver is to adhere to
the first approach and to attempt to identify each and every type of
provision that may be unenforceable under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction (s).
B.

Categorizing the Exceptions.

Exceptions to the remedies opinion are based upon concerns
of either: (1) equity; (2) public policy; or (3) statutory law or case
law. Often, statutory law and case law do not designate whether
the law derives from an evaluation of the provision from an equity
or from a public policy perspective. Whether a concern implicit in
an exception must be separately and expressly addressed or
whether it can be included within the scope of a broader exception
depends upon which of these three categories forms the basis of
the exception. This is particularly true if the borrower's counsel's
opinion includes an exception for the application of general principles of equity. 20 If the borrower's counsel's opinion contains
such an exception, it is not necessary for other particular exceptions based solely in equity to be separately expressly stated. If, on
the other hand, a particular exception may be based in part upon
public policy concerns, then it may be necessary to include a separate express exception to address the public policy concerns. Set
forth below is a categorization of various exceptions identifying
whether they may be based on equitable principles, public policy
and/or law.
Exception

Basis

Bankruptcy & Insolvency
Judicial Discretion

Equity, Public Policy & Law
Equity & Law

Equitable Principles
Practical Realization

Equity
Equity, Public Policy & Law

ISRA (ECRA)

Law

Attorney's Fees
Dragnet Provisions

Public Policy & Law
Equity, Public Policy & Law2 '

19 See generaUy 2 M.JOHN STERBA, DRAFrING LEGAL OPINION LErrERS 147-247 (1992)
(discussing legal opinion liability).
20 See generally infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (relating to the equitable
principles exception).
21 Although the NewJersey courts have not expressly ruled on the enforceability of
dragnet clauses, other jurisdictions that have addressed such clauses have considered
the enforceability of such clauses to be an issue of both public policy and law. See, e.g.,
Canal Nat'l Bank v. Becker, 431 A.2d 71, 74 (Me. 1981) (indicating under Maine law
that dragnet clauses often work forfeitures, which are violative of New Jersey public
policy); Akamine & Sons, Ltd. v. American Security Bank, 440 P.2d 262, 268 (Haw.
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Compound Interest
Equity, Public Policy & Law
Post-Default Interest
Equity & Public Policy
Late Charges
Equity & Public Policy
Prepayment Penalties
Equity & Public Policy
Powers of Attorney
Equity, Public Policy & Law
Amendments in Writing
Law
Indemnification
Public Policy
Waivers
Public Policy & Law
Laches
Equity & Public Policy
The foregoing analysis indicates that many of the exceptions
addressed above may be covered by the exception for equitable
principles. Nonetheless, because the provisions addressed by such
exceptions may also be held unenforceable for reasons of public
policy or law, borrower's counsel rendering an opinion without
such exceptions runs the risk that a New Jersey court may hold
such provision unenforceable based upon public policy or other
legal considerations unrelated to principles of equity.
Although attorneys subscribing to the second approach to
opinion letters would find it unnecessary to include most of the
exceptions discussed below in their opinions, it should be noted
that such attorneys almost always include exceptions for bankruptcy and insolvency laws and for judicial discretion and general
equitable principles. By contrast, however, an attorney who subscribes to the first approach of the remedies opinion would include
many of these exceptions because they address law that is generally
related to commercial loan transactions or may be related to the
particular borrower.
C. Exceptions.
1.

Bankruptcy & Insolvency.

In New Jersey, as in most other jurisdictions,2 2 the opinion
1968) (holding dragnet clause violative of public policy under Hawaii law) and In re
Swanson, 104 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989) (holding dragnet clauses to violate
Sections 9-110 and 9-204 of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code). It is the author's
opinion that a NewJersey court may hold such a provision to not only violate law and
public policy, but also to be inequitable.
22 ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 202-04; TriBarReport, supranote 11, at 1914; Tribar
Remedies Report, supra note 11, at 960; California Report, supra note 5, at 2211; Arizona
Report, supra note 17, at 591-92; Report on Standardsfor Opinions of FloridaCounsel of the
Special Committee on Opinion Standards of the Florida Bar Business Law Section, 46 Bus.
LAw. 1407, 1437 (1991) [hereinafter F/oridaReport]; Georgia Report supra note 17, at
§ 10.05; SpecialJoint Committee on Lawyers' Opinions in Commercial Transactions,45 Bus.
LAw. 705, 735 (1990) [hereinafter Maryland Report]; Subcommittee on Opinion Writing, Committee on Corporate, Banking, and Business Law, Massachusetts Bar Association, Omnibus Opinion for Use in Loan Transactions,60 MAss. L.Q. 193, 199-200 (1976)
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giver is usually permitted to exclude bankruptcy and insolvency
laws from the scope of the opinion. The exception usually states
that:
The opinions expressed herein are subject to and may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, fraudulent conveyance, fraudulent transfer, moratorium or other similar laws
of general application, now or hereafter in effect, affecting the
enforcement of creditors' rights in general.2"
It is commonly understood that in the event that any of these
laws become applicable, the enforceability of the agreements will
be necessarily subject to the law.2 4 Except in truly unusual circumstances, opinions as to bankruptcy laws are rarely required due to
the difficulty involved in rendering such opinions. 5 Particularly
in connection with mid-market transactions, it is unduly burdensome to request a borrower's attorney to render an opinion as to
bankruptcy and insolvency laws generally. Further, any opinion
which could be rendered would, mostly likely, be subject to so
many qualifications and exceptions as to render the opinion of little value.2 6
There are, however, a few limited circumstances (usually in
connection with high-end transactions) in which an opinion as to
particular bankruptcy or insolvency laws may be justified. For example, in connection with a debtor-in-possession (DIP) or similar
bankruptcy financing arrangement, the lender may be particularly
concerned as to certain matters affecting the transaction. 27 Simi[hereinafter Massachusetts Report]. It has been suggested that the bankruptcy exception should not apply to security interest opinions since such opinions address only
the effect of compliance with the U.C.C.. Special Report by the TribarOpinion Committee,
U.C.C. Security Interest Opinions, 49 Bus. LAw. 359 (1993) [hereinafter Security Interest
Report]. Unfortunately, there is no support for this proposition in case law construing
opinion letters, and borrower's counsel may be exposed to liability to the opinion
recipient where the bankruptcy of the borrower adversely affects the recipient's security interest.
23 The ABA Accord version of the bankruptcy exception does not expressly include fraudulent transfer or fraudulent conveyance in the initial articulation of the
exception; however, it goes on to provide that the exception is intended to cover such
laws. ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 202-3.
24 Security Interest Report, supra note 22, at 369. The Tribar Opinion Committee
goes so far as to state that the bankruptcy exception together with the equitable principles exception should be understood even if not expressly stated. Tribar Remedies
Report, supra note 11, at 960-61.
25 Special Report by the TriBar Opinion Committee: Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context:
Rating Agency, Structured Financing and Chapter11 Transactions,46 Bus. LAw. 717, 723
(1991); TribarRemedies Report, supra note 11, at 962-63.
26
27

Id.

For example, a DIP financing lender would be concerned that the procedural
requirements of the order approving the financing had been duly observed, that the
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larly, in the event that the borrower is known to be insolvent at the
time the loan is made or is refinanced, the lender may be unwilling
to risk the application of fraudulent transfer laws which may result
in the transaction being set aside.28 In most cases, however, and in
all mid-market transactions, the benefits of an opinion as to bankruptcy and insolvency matters is outweighed by the time and expense involved in rendering such an opinion, as well as an ultimate
value of the opinion.
2.

JudicialDiscretion & Equitable Principles.

It is difficult for any lawyer to predict how a given court or
other judicial body may view a particular factual circumstance.
This results from the fact that although judges apply the law, they
are given great discretion to interpret the law and determine the
appropriate application of the law to the facts. For this reason,
another commonly expressed exception to the remedies opinion is
an exception for the application of judicial discretion and equitable principles. 29 A common formulation of this exception is:
The opinion is subject to and limited by judicial discretion and
general principles of equity (regardless of whether considered
in a proceeding in equity or at law) and we wish to advise you
that the remedy of specific performance or injunctive relief
(whether considered in a proceeding in equity or at law) is subject to the exercise of judicial discretion.
In reviewing or preparing an opinion, it is important to underorder was not subject to appeal or that if the order is subject to appeal that there has
been a finding of good faith sufficient to insure the lien priority of the lender for
advances made prior to the expiration of the time period for appeals. 11 U.S.C. § 364

(1988).
28 New Jersey adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act on August 1, 1988.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:2-20 to -32 (West 1940 & Supp. 1994). Similarly, the Bankruptcy
Code provides that such transactions may be set aside. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988).
29 ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 204-05; TriBar Report, supra note 11, at 1914; Arizona
Report, supranote 17, at 592; F/oridaReport, supra note 22, at 1437; Georgia Report, supra
note 17, at §10.05B; Maryland Report, supra note 22, at 735.
30 In alternate formulations of this exception, attorneys will sometimes include the
following examples of limitations arising out of the application of equitable
principles:
Including, without limitation, principles that (i) include a requirement
that a creditor act with reasonableness, in good faith and deal fairly with
its debtors, (ii) limit a creditor's right to accelerate maturity of a debt
upon the occurrence of a default deemed immaterial, or (iii) might
render certain waivers unenforceable ....
Such additional text provides examples only and should not be construed as broadening the scope of the exception. However, with regard to waivers, it may be insufficient
for the opining attorney to rely solely on the equitable principles exception, since
many waivers may be held unenforceable on public policy or statutory grounds. See
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stand that many of the limitations to the remedies opinion will be
addressed by the formulation of the exception set forth above.
Much of the New Jersey case law that would render certain provisions of loan documents unenforceable or would limit the enforceability of such provisions is based upon, at least in part, general
principles of equity.3 ' If this exception is included in the opinion,
it should not be necessary to add further exceptions to the remedies opinion to address such cases. Nonetheless, it is not unusual
for borrower's counsel to expressly include exceptions addressing
specific provisions of the agreement with which he or she may be
particularly concerned since, as noted above, such exceptions may
address provisions which may be unenforceable due to public policy or other concerns in addition to equitable concerns.
Typically, the types of matters that are covered by the general
equitable principles exception are matters that cannot be avoided
by careful drafting or by structuring of the loan. This is usually
because the lender seeks to obtain the greatest protection permitted by law and will therefore be unwilling to omit terms of an
agreement merely because they may be unenforceable."2
Conversely, since the lender either knows or should know that certain
terms of the loan documentation may not be enforceable as written, it would be inappropriate for a lender to require that the borrower's counsel give a remedies opinion without including the
exception for equitable principles. Since most lenders are aware
that the enforceability of certain provisions of the loan documents
may be subject to overriding equitable principles of law, this is a
risk that is implicit in extending virtually all types of credit. It is,
therefore, generally important to lenders that the opinion distinguish between exceptions to the remedies opinion which are based
on general principles of equity (which they accept as part of the
credit risk) and exceptions to the remedies opinion which are
made for other reasons (of which they may otherwise be unaware).
In this way, the lender may be better able to evaluate the credit
risks involved.

supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (relating to a categorization of the
exceptions).
31 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (relating to a categorization of the
exceptions).
32 For example, lenders will generally be unwilling to modify contractual provisions which provide for high default rates or interest or late fees, even though such
provisions may be unenforceable penalties. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying
text (relating to post-default interest and late charges).
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PracticalRealization.

One of the most important concerns of the lender is that the
remedial provisions of the loan documents are enforceable. To
some extent, the equitable principles exception puts the lender on
notice that the lender may be unable to exercise certain remedial
rights purported to be granted by the loan documents if such exercise should be deemed inequitable. In an effort to give some comfort to lenders that the equitable principles exception is not
intended to wholly undermine the remedies opinion, it is not uncommon for lenders to require, and for borrower's counsel to give,
the opinion that the remedial provisions of the loan documents
are generally adequate for the lender to realize the practical benefits of the loan. 33 This type of exception is commonly formulated
as follows:
Certain remedial provisions in the Loan Documents, in addition
to those expressly qualified by the phrase "to the extent permitted by law" or comparable provisions, may be unenforceable in
whole or in part, but the inclusion of such provisions does not
render the other provisions thereof invalid, and collectively, the
Loan Documents contain adequate remedial provisions for the
practical realization of the rights and benefits afforded thereby
and for enforcing payment of the amounts due thereunder (except for the economic consequences of any delay that arises
from such lack of enforceability).
There is a surprising lack of understanding among both attorneys and lenders as to what this exception is intended to mean.
This may be due to the lack of precision in the phrase "practical
realization."" At least two matters should, however, be clear from
the plain text of the exception.
First, the exception is intended to address only the remedial
terms of the loan documents. Because it is silent with respect to
the other terms of the documents (e.g., interest rates, advance criteria, affirmative or negative covenants), the lender is put on notice that it may not be able to enforce certain of the remedial rights
which the loan documents purport to grant to the lender.
33

LEGAL

OPINIONS,

supra note 4, at 252-53; Mayland Report, supra note 22, at 739-

40. The ABA Accord does not address the interpretation of practical realization provisions except to state that such provisions should not be construed to override the
bankruptcy or equitable principles exceptions. ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 202.
34 ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 225-26; TriBar Remedies Report, supra note 11, at 965;

Arizona Report, note 17, at 592-94; Maryland Report, note 22, at 739-40; ARTHUR N. FIELD
&

READE H. RYAN, LEGAL OPINIONS
[hereinafter FIELD & RYAN].

IN CoRPoRATE

TRANSACnONs 7-5 to 7-8 (1992)
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Second, particular attention is drawn to those provisions
which are qualified by the phrase "to the extent provided by law."
It is not unusual for loan documents to so qualify remedial provisions that, for example, purport to give the lender the right to exercise self-help remedies or that purport to permit the lender to
sell collateral with limited or no notice under specified conditions.
The ability of the lender to exercise these remedies will be limited
to the extent provided by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.15 In certain high-end transactions, especially transactions involving more than one jurisdiction, lenders may be particularly
concerned with the lack of enforceability of such provisions and
may reasonably request a more specific opinion about such
provisions.
What is arguably unclear about this exception is the meaning
of the last phrase, which is intended to provide the lender with
comfort that it will be able to exercise certain remedies against the
collateral in order to be paid. It is, perhaps, just as important to
understand what the exception does not mean as it is to understand what the exception does mean. The exception is neither intended to mean that the lender will in fact be repaid and made
whole, nor that there are no defenses to the lender's right to be
repaid. 36 Likewise, the exception is not intended to mean that the
loan documents provide for the maximum protection afforded by
law.
It is the author's opinion that the exception is intended to
mean: (1) that notwithstanding what the terms of the loan documents purport to provide, the lender may be delayed in its ability
to sell collateral upon a default and may lose money as a result of
such delays and (2) that the loan documents and the law applicable to the loan documents provide the lender with a legal remedy 7
which, if properly and diligently pursued, will permit the lender to
seek repayment from the collateral securing the loan and will permit the lender to pursue any other parties liable for the debt."
35 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-501 to -507 (West 1962 & Supp. 1994). Many of these
remedies and the protections to debtors afforded by their provisions may not be
waived. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-501 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
36 Maryland Report, supra note 22, at 739-40.
37 The practical realization exception should not be construed to mean that every
legal remedy purported to be provided in the loan documents will necessarily be available to the lender exactly as written. Rather, it should be construed to mean that
some legally meaningful remedy will be available to the lender.
38 For a further discussion of "Practical Realization" language, see SpecialJoint Committee on Lawyers' Opinions in Commercial Transactions,45 Bus. LAw. 705, 739-40 (1990);
TriBar Remedies Report, supra note 11, at 964-66.
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Industrial Site Recovery Act (formerly Environmental Cleanup
Responsibility Act).

In the past, it was not uncommon for borrower's counsel in
asset-based lending transactions in New Jersey to include an exception based on the potential applicability of the Environmental
Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA). v The exception read as
follows:
The opinions expressed herein are subject to the provisions of
the New Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act
(ECRA) in the event there occurs a closing, terminating or
transferring of operations within the meaning of N.J.A.C. 7:26B1.5 (b) after the date hereof (which provision may prevent foreclosure of any lien on any collateral pending compliance with
the requirements of ECRA).
The concern was that either the granting of a security interest
(which is in itself a form of assignment of rights in property) in or
a lender's foreclosure sale of the assets of the borrower may be
considered a "transferring of operations"4 which was an ECRA
triggering event. 41 Thus, compliance with ECRA would be required before the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection would permit the consummation of any such sale. The
recent revisions to ECRA implemented in the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) 42 attempted to address this concern. Significant
unresolved issues remain, however, with regard to the extent to
which ISRA may interfere with a secured lender's exercise of remedies against personal property collateral. ISRA expressly excludes a
lender's foreclosure on asset-based collateral as one of the events
(change in ownership) triggering compliance with remedial and
other requirements under the statute. 4 ' Accordingly, lenders
39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 to -35 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). The New York approach would exclude the requirement for exceptions to an opinion based upon
ECRA. Tibar Remedies Report, supra note 11, at 968. However, ISRA, like ECRA, is a
very unique state statute and is not known to many foreign lenders. Furthermore, it is
not uncommon for foreign lenders not to hire NewJersey counsel in connection with
loans to New Jersey entities. Such a foreign lender would most likely be surprised to
find out that the enforcement of its loan agreement was subject to ISRA, and would
consider it to be the duty of the borrower's New Jersey counsel to bring such a peculiar state statute to the attention of the lender.
40 Under ECRA, a transfer of operations included any "transaction . . .through
which an industrial establishment undergoes [a] change in ownership." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:1K-8 (West 1991 and Supp. 1994).
41
42

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 13:1K-11a (West 1991 and Supp. 1994).

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -11.11, 58:1011-1 to -20, and 58:10-23.llg (West
1991 and Supp. 1994).
43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-8 (West 1991 and Supp. 1994).
The definition of
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should no longer be concerned that the grant of the security interest or their conduct in exercising remedies on asset-based collateral will, in and of itself, be considered a "change in ownership"
triggering ISRA. Notwithstanding this revision to ECRA, however,
at least three substantial concerns remain.
First, ISRA requires compliance with the statute prior to any
"transfer of ownership or operations." 44 The definition of "transferring of ownership or operations" includes not only a "change in
ownership," but also a sale or transfer of more than 50% of the
assets of the industrial establishment. 5 Accordingly, the statute appears to require compliance with its requirements not only prior to
any change in ownership, but also prior to any sale or transfer of
more than 50% of the assets. Although a lender's execution of
remedies against personal property collateral will no longer, in and
of itself, be deemed a "change in ownership," if the lender forecloses on more than 50% of the assets of the industrial establishment, the lender may be required to comply with ISRA.
Second, a lender may not be safe even where the lender lends
only against 50% of the borrower's assets. Under the statute, a
transfer of ownership or operations occurs upon a transfer of 50%
of the industrial establishment's assets "within any five year period,
as measured on a constant, annual date-specific basis."4 6 The statute is unclear as to whether both real and personal property are
intended to be included in the term "asset." Arguably, personal
property should be exempt to the same extent it is exempt in the
event of a "change in ownership." In calculating the 50% threshold, the statute would include sales, transfers or other dispositions
occurring in the ordinary course of business (e.g., sale of equipment or inventory) over the last five-year period. Furthermore, the
method of valuation is unclear.4 7 The only guidance provided by
"change in ownership" expressly excludes the "execution, delivery and filing or recording of any mortgage, security interest, collateral assignment or other lien on real
or personal property" and "any transfer of personal property pursuant to a valid security agreement, collateral assignment or other lien, including, but not limited to
seizure or replevin of such personal property which transfer is for the purpose of
implementing the secured party's rights in the personal property which is the collateral." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-8 (West 1991 and Supp. 1994).
44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-9(c) (West 1991 and Supp. 1994).
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-8 (West 1991 and Supp. 1994).
46 Id.
47 The statute does not expressly state that the 50% threshold is determined by
reference to a valuation of the assets. The statute could be read to refer to 50% of the
number of assets. If this is the correct interpretation, the statute is unclear as to
whether assets may be grouped in determining the 50% threshold. For example, are
all of the paper clips one asset or is each paper clip a separate asset? The very absurd-
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the statute is that the method must be constant, annual and datespecific.4" Both fair market and book valuations, however, may be
performed in a manner consistent with such requirements. Since
there is often a substantial difference between the fair market value
and the book value of a business's assets, it is almost impossible for
borrower's counsel to determine whether a sale of collateral would
trigger the compliance requirements of the statute.
Finally, of grave concern to lenders is the fact that any transaction consummated prior to the transferor's compliance with ISRA's
requirements may be voided. 49 Even if all of the traditional legal
requirements for the transfer of title to property have been fulfilled, the transaction may, nonetheless, be voided if it was consummated in violation of ISRA.
Although it may have been the intent of the legislature to address the concerns of asset-based lenders under ECRA, ISRA still
leaves many questions unanswered. While these concerns may be
addressed in future regulations issued under ISRA, until then, an
exception to the remedies opinion is still required in order for borrower's counsel to avoid rendering an opinion that would be contrary to ISRA.
5.

Attorney's Fees.

Loan documents generally include provisions which permit
the lender to collect attorney's fees as part of its damages in connection with the exercise of its remedies. However, the strict enforceability of such provisions is limited.
First, rules of ethics and common law require that attorney's
fees must be reasonable.5 0 Accordingly, loan document provisions
which purport to provide that the lender may collect a fixed percentage or a fixed amount for attorney's fees may not be enforceable if such a fee would not be reasonable in light of the actual work
performed by the lender's attorney. 1
ity of the example indicates that the intent of the statute was that the calculation be
made by reference to a valuation of the assets.
48 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-8 (West 1991 and Supp. 1994).
49 "Failure of the transferor to perform a remediation and obtain department approval... is grounds for voiding the sale or transfer of an industrial establishment or
any real property utilized in connection therewith by the transferee." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:lK-13(a) (West 1991 and Supp. 1994).
50 NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.5(a) (1994); Alcoa Edgewater No. I Fed. Credit Union v. Carroll, 44 N.J. 442, 448, 210 A.2d 68, 72 (1965);
Center Grove Assoc. v. Hoerr, 146 N.J. Super. 472, 474, 370 A.2d 55, 56 (App. Div.
1977).
51 Alcoa Edgewater, 44 N.J. at 449-50, 210 A.2d at 73.
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Second, New Jersey Court Rules contain many provisions
which place limitations on attorney's fees. 2 Although many of
these rules are not clearly applicable to the exercise of remedies in
loan documentation, it is not unreasonable for borrower's counsel
to limit the opinion by referencing the NewJersey Court Rules generally. An opinion as to the applicability of each Court Rule addressing attorney's fees would be extremely cumbersome and
would add almost no value to all mid-market transactions and
would add only little value to high-end transactions. Moreover,
lenders generally do not decide whether or not to extend credit on
the basis of the amount of attorney's fees that a lender may collect
in the event of a default. In high-end transactions, however, particularly where the lenders are based out of state, the lender may require a more extensive opinion as to attorney's fees. This is usually
due to the lender's unfamiliarity with New Jersey law.
6.

DragnetProvisions.

Dragnet provisions are particular provisions in loan documents by which a lender attempts to provide either that debt is
secured by any other property of the borrower, now or hereafter
pledged to the lender, or that the collateral pledged to the lender
also secures any other present or future debt of the borrower to
the lender. Many jurisdictions have held that such provisions are
unenforceable unless the cross-collateralization with non-related
debt or collateral was expressly contemplated at the time of the
transaction providing for the dragnet provision.5" To date, the
52 NewJersey Court Rules generally deny recovery of attorney's fees in all but a few
specified circumstances. Current N.J. COURT RuL.s, R. 4:42-9 (1993). The rule, however, does not preclude attorney's fees "where the parties have agreed thereto in advance by stipulation in a promissory note, power of attorney or other agreement or
contract .... Such provision will, however, be strictly construed in light of the general
policy disfavoring counsel fee awards." PRESSLER, CuRRiEr N.J. COURT RuLEs, Comment R. 4:42-9. See also Meyner and Landis v. Turtletaub, 248 N.J.Super. 690, 591
A.2d 1043 (Law Div. 1991); Alcoa Edgerater,44 N.J. at 442, 210 A.2d at 68; Cohen v.
Fair Lawn Dairies, Inc., 44 N.J. 450 (1965).
53 Uransky v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 684 F.2d 750 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying
Florida law); Kimball Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 557 F.2d 401 (5th
Cir. 1977) (applying Texas law); In reSwanson, 104 B.R. 1 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989); In re
Hunter, 68 B.R. 366 (Bankr. C.D. 1986); In re Bates, 35 B.R. 475 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1983); In re Grizaffi, 23 B.R. 137 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); In re Goodman Industries,
Inc., 21 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); Marine Nat'l Bank v. Airco, Inc., 389 F.Supp.
231 (W.D. Pa. 1975); National Bank v. Blakenship, 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ark. 1959),
aff'd sub nom. National Bank v. General Mills, 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960) (applying
Arkansas law); Ex parteChandler, 477 So. 2d 360 (Ala. 1985); Underwood v. Jarvis, 358
So. 2d. 731 (Ala. 1978); Akamine & Sons, Ltd. v. American Security Bank, 440 P.2d
262 (Haw. 1968); First v. Byrne, 28 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 1947); First Nat'l Bank in Wich-
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New Jersey courts have not directly addressed the issue of the enforceability of such clauses. Accordingly, many borrowers' attorneys in New Jersey will include the following exception in their
opinions in order to put lenders on notice that such dragnet provisions may not be enforceable:
We express no opinion as to the creation or perfection of any
security interest that purports to secure any present or future
obligations or liabilities of the borrower to the Lender that are
determined, in the case of obligations or liabilities to the
Lender created in the future, not to constitute "future advances"
within the meaning of Section 9-204(3) of the UCC, are determined not to have been within the contemplation of the borrower at the time the Loan Documents were consummated, or
are determined not to be of the same character or class as the
obligations and liabilities to the Lender created or arising under
the Loan Documents.
Where the loan is secured by all of the borrower's property
and assets and where the loan agreement prohibits the borrower
from obtaining any other secured financing, lenders often object
to the inclusion of such an exception in the borrower's counsel's
opinion. In such circumstances, the exception may be
unnecessary.
7.

Interest, Late Charges & Prepayment Penalties.

Another exception to the remedies opinion is an exception
for the enforceability of provisions permitting the lender to charge
interest on interest (otherwise known as compounding interest),
late charges or post-default rates of interest. The exception is customarily formulated as follows:
The opinions expressed herein are subject to the non-enforceability of provisions providing for "interest on interest" or the
payment of late charges, post-default increased interest rates,
liquidated damages or prepayment premiums.
(a)

Interest on Interest/Compound Interest.

Under New Jersey case law, courts will not enforce compounding of interest by savings and loan associations unless such
ita v. Fink, 241 Kan. 321, 736 P.2d 909 (1987); Emporia State Bank & Trust Co. v.
Mounkes, 519 P.2d 618 (Kan. 1974); First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Lygrisse, 7 Kan.
App. 2d 291, 640 P.2d 1274 (Ct. App. 1982); Canal Nat'l Bank v. Becker, 431 A.2d 71
(Me. 1981); Freese Leasing, Inc. v. Union Trust and Say. Bank, 253 N.W.2d 921
(1977); First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 (Utah 1980);John Miller Supply Co., Inc. v. Western State Bank, 55 Wis. 2d 385, 199 N.W.2d 161 (1972).
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provisions are expressly provided in the agreement or unless the
agreement contains an express incorporation of the statute permitting such compounding.5 4 Loan documents often incorporate provisions providing that the powers and remedies of the lender
provided for under the loan documents are cumulative and in addition to any powers or rights permitted by law. Although New
Jersey law permits savings and loan associations to charge compound interest,5 5 notwithstanding the provisions of loan documents which purport to give a savings and loan association
cumulative rights, powers and remedies, such provisions may not
be enforceable if such powers are not expressly provided in the
contract. Although the current case law is limited to the power of
savings and loan associations to charge compound interest, the reasoning set forth in the applicable New Jersey case law is equally
applicable to other lenders.
(b)

Post-Default Interest.

New Jersey courts' analysis of post-default rates of interest and
late charges can be likened to the courts' analysis of liquidated
damages clauses. 5 6 Specifically, such provisions may not be enforceable if they are penal in nature and not in the nature of liquidated damages.5 7 Increases in interest rates after a default or
maturity from 21% to 30%58 17% to 33%,59 9% to 24%,6" and
30.18% to 38.76%61 have been held to be penal in nature and are
therefore unenforceable. Although a New Jersey court has indicated in dicta that a 3% increase in interest rate upon default may
bear a reasonable relationship to the actual administrative expenses incurred by a lender,6 2 it has been held that, under New
54 Crest Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Mason, 243 N.J. Super. 646, 581 A.2d 120 (Ch. Div.
1990); Shadow Lawn Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Palmarozza, 190 N.J. Super. 314, 463 A.2d
384 (App. Div. 1983).
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:12B-48(14) (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
56 Crest Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 243 N.J. Super. at 648, 581 A.2d at 121.
57 Monsen Engineering Co. v. Tami-Githens, Inc., 219 N.J. Super. 241, 530 A.2d
313 (App. Div. 1987); Westmont Country Club v. Kameny, 82 N.J. Super. 200, 197
A.2d 379 (App. Div. 1964).
58 In reTastyeast, Inc., 126 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Modem Factors
Co. v. Tastyeast, Inc., 316 U.S. 696 (1942).
59 Feller v. Architects Display Bldgs., Inc., 54 N.J. Super. 205, 148 A.2d 634 (App.
Div. 1959).
60 Stuchin v. Kasirer, 237 N.J. Super. 604 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 121 N.J.
660, 583 A.2d 346 (1990).
61 Spiotta v. William H. Wilson, Inc., 72 N.J. Super. 572, 179 A.2d 49 (App. Div.
1962).
62 In re Timberline Property Dev., Inc., 136 B.R. 382, 386 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992).
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Jersey law, even a 3% increase in interest rate which is intended as
a means to coerce payment by the borrower is an unenforceable
63
penalty.
(c)

Late Charges.6 4

Late charges are enforceable in New Jersey only if they are
administrative expenses intended to compensate the lender for the
cost of money wrongfully withheld. 65 Furthermore, upon the acceleration of a loan, the lender cannot collect late charges.6 6 Once
the loan has been accelerated, the lender is considered to have
repudiated the borrower's right to make regular payments and, accordingly, no late charge may be imposed.6 7 Furthermore,
although no New Jersey court has expressly ruled on the issue, the
Administrative Director of the Courts has issued a statement
prohibiting the lender from charging more than one late charge
for each payment in arrears.' While the statement does not have
the force of law, it does indicate how the courts are likely to hold.
In fact, the statement has been used as support by at least one New
Jersey court."
(d)

Prepayment Penalties.

Generally, prepayment penalties in commercial loan agreements are enforceable in New Jersey70 to the extent that they are
intended to compensate the lender for its future right to interest
or other losses (including tax benefits) that may result from prepayment.7" A lender may not be entitled, however, to impose a
prepayment penalty for involuntary prepayments, including payments arising out of the mortgagee's acceleration of the
63

Id.

64 For a thorough general discussion on late payment charges, see I NELSON AND
WHITMAN, R.AL ESTATE FINANCE LAw 515-20 (3d ed. 1994).
65 Crest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 243 NJ. Super. at 649, 581 A.2d at 121 (citing Garrett v.
Coast & S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845, 511 P.2d 1197 (1973)); NELSON
AND WHrrmAN, supra note 64, at 514.
66 Crest Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 243 N.J. Super. at 649, 581 A.2d at 122. See also State
Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Batterson, 77 N.J.L. 57 (1908); Manhattan & S. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Massarelli, 42 A. 284, 286 (NJ. Ch. 1899).
67 Id.
68 110 NEW JERsEY L.J. 325 (1982).

69 Crest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 243 N.J. Super. at 650, 581 A.2d at 122 (holding that
mortgage late charges arising after complaint was filed were unenforceable).
70 Prepayment penalties are unenforceable in connection with mortgage loans secured by a structure containing one to six dwelling units where the interest rate exceeds 6%. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-2 (West 1989).
71 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Minassian, 777 F. Supp. 385 (D.N.J. 1991).
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indebtedness.7 2

8.

Powers of Attorney.

There is no NewJersey law specifically confirming that powers
of attorney given to lenders in connection with commercial loans
are generally enforceable. However, under NewJersey law, powers
of attorney which give the agent the authority to "conduct banking
transactions as set forth in section 2 of P.L.1991, c. 95 (C.46:2B11)" provide the agent with a broad variety of banking powers.7 3
Although certain financial institutions may not honor a power of
attorney which does not incorporate such statutory reference, such
a practice is unwarranted. The statute itself expressly provides that
it is not intended to be the exclusive method of providing powers
of attorney for banking transactions. 4
One provision relating to powers of attorney found in loan
documentation that requires an exception to the remedies opinion
is that the power of attorney is irrevocable. Although no New
Jersey case has ruled on the issue, most likely a court would not
enforce the lender's right to exercise the power of attorney after
the loan in connection with which the power was granted had been
repaid in full. 75 This is because, implicit in powers of attorney
granted in connection with loan documentation, is the fact that
the lender will not exercise the powers granted thereunder after
the loan has been repaid.7 6 Accordingly, where a power of attorney in loan documentation either purports to be irrevocable or
72 Clinton Capital Corp. v. Straeb, 248 N.J. Super. 19, 589 A.2d 1363 (Ch. Div.
1990); Jala Corp v. Berkeley Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 104 N.J. Super. 394, 250 A.2d 150
(App. Div. 1969). See also In reLHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying Indiana law); Landohio Corp. v. Northwestern Mut. Lif. Mortgage & Realty Inv.,
431 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Oh. 1976).
73 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-11(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
74 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-11 (8) (West 1989 and Supp. 1994).
75 The rationale applied to the enforceability of dragnet provisions is equally applicable to powers of attorney that purport to be irrevocable. Under the line of cases
holding dragnet provisions to be unenforceable, the courts' holdings are based on
the factual conclusion that the debt which the plaintiff is attempting to enforce was
not contemplated at the time of the original transaction. See supra § II. C. 6 and
accompanying footnote (relating to "Dragnet Provisions"). Since debts other than
those which arise under the transaction in connection with which the power of attorney was granted (the "Granting Transaction") may not be contemplated at the time of
the Granting Transaction, it is reasonable to conclude that a court would not permit a
creditor to exercise a power of attorney to collect a debt not contemplated by the
parties at the time of the Granting Transaction.
76 Where a portion of the loan involves revolving credit, the implication should be
extended to the fact that the power of attorney will survive until both the loan has
been repaid and the lender's obligation to make further advances has terminated.
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does not provide that it will terminate upon the repayment of the
loan, it is not unreasonable for the opining attorney to include an
exception to the remedies opinion that states:
The opinions expressed are subject to the non-enforceability of
provisions permitting the Lender to exercise rights under a
power of attorney granted in connection with the Loan Documents after the Lender has been paid in full all amounts due in
connection with the Loan Documents and the Lender's obligation to make further advances has terminated.
9.

Amendments in Writing.

It is customary for loan documents to contain a "boilerplate"
provision which states that any amendments to the loan documents
must be made in writing. Such provisions have been held to be
unenforceable in New Jersey.7 7 The New Jersey Statute of Frauds
was amended in 1991, however, to provide protection for a
lender's oral assurances to borrowers or potential borrowers.7 8
Under the amendment, actions on commercial contracts 79 or commitments to loan over $100,000 and renewals of such loans cannot
be instituted unless evidenced by a writing signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought.8" It is unclear from the face
of the statute whether it applies to all provisions of existing loan
agreements or whether it applies only to those portions of existing
loan agreements that provide for the lender's commitment to lend
money. Because the statute is not clear as to whether it is intended
to cover all loan documents, an exception to the remedies opinion
should customarily be included in the borrower's counsel's opinion letter. Set forth below is a proposed form of such an
exception:
The opinions expressed are subject to the non-enforceability of
provisions requiring amendments or waivers of the provisions of
agreements or documents to be written (other than as provided
pursuant to N.J.S.A. §25:1-5).
10.

Indemnification.

Loan documents often contain language in which the lender
77 Estate of Connelly v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975), affd 551
F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Frommeyer v. L. & R. Constr. Co., 261 F.2d 879 (3d
Cir. 1958).
78 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5(f) (West Supp. 1994).
79 The amendment to the statute expressly excludes loans primarily for personal,
family or household purposes. Id.

80 Id.
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requires that the borrower indemnify the lender for any liability
the lender incurs in connection with its performance under the
loan documentation. Under NewJersey law, provided that the provision does not violate public policy, the general rule with regard to
such provisions is that they are enforceable to relieve the indemnified party of liability for negligence.8 1 Such provisions, however,
are not enforceable to relieve the lender from liability for willful
misconduct.8 2 The courts are split as to whether a party may generally contract itself out of liability for its own reckless or grossly negligent conduct.8" The only two New Jersey courts that have
considered the enforceability of provisions intended to exculpate
institutional lenders from liability have held that banks may not
relieve themselves of liability for negligence.8 4 The reason for this
variation may be that the courts view institutional lenders, such as
banks, as having a special relationship with the public justifying the
higher standard. 5 Because the New Jersey courts appear to hold
institutional lenders to a higher standard than other entities, it is
81 Alderney Dairy Co., Inc. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 643 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1981);
Farris Engineering Corp. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 276 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.J. 1967); Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 48 NJ. 483, 226 A.2d 602 (1967), on remand 97 NJ. Super. 116,
234 A.2d 503, affd sub. nom. Natell v. Henley, 103 NJ. Super. 161, 246 A.2d 749 (App.
Div. 1968); Moreira Const. Co. v. Moretrench Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 391, 235 A.2d 211
(App. Div. 1967), affid 51 NJ. 405 (1968). But see TunkI v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
383 P.2d 441, 445-446, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38 (1963) (holding indemnity provisions
unenforceable even to the extent that they attempt to exonerate a party from liability
for negligent conduct).
82 Tessler and Son, Inc. v. Sonitrol Sec. Systems of N. New Jersey, Inc., 203 NJ.
Super. 477, 497 A.2d 530 (App. Div. 1985).
83 Tessler, 203 NJ. Super. at 485-86 (holding that exculpatory provisions are enforceable to limit a party's liability for gross negligence). But see Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (App. Div. 1955); Swisscraft Novelty Co. v.
Alad Realty Corp., 113 N.J. Super. 416, 274 A.2d 59 (App. Div. 1971) (holding that
exculpatory clauses are not enforceable to relieve a party of liability for gross
negligence).
84 Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. NewJersey Bank, 138 N.J. Super. 112, 350 A.2d 279 (App.
Div. 1975) (proclaiming that a bank had a public duty with regard to night deposit
arrangements and may not relieve itself of liability for negligence); Erlich v. First Nat'l
Bank of Princeton, 208 N.J. Super. 264, 505 A.2d 220 (Law Div. 1984) (declaring that
a bank could not contract out of liability for negligent conduct in connection with
investment advisory services).
85 Hy-Grade Oil Co., 138 NJ. Super. at 118, 350 A.2d at 282. This special relationship may be found even in commercial transactions. For example, it has been held
that a bank which acts as an agent in a multibank loan has a fiduciary obligation to
the participant banks. Contractual waivers of liability for negligent conduct of such
agent banks have been held unenforceable. Chemical Bank v. Security Pacific Nat'l
Bank, 20 F.3d 375 (9th Cir. 1994). Often in multibank loans, an agent bank also
performs various functions for the benefit of the borrower which could be construed
to create a fiduciary obligation from the agent bank to the borrower which would
render waivers of the agent bank's negligent conduct unenforceable.
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appropriate for borrower's counsel to provide the following exception with respect to such provisions:
The opinions are subject to the non-enforceability of provisions
requiring the borrower to indemnify the Lender or its agents or
any of the provisions exculpating the Lender from liability for its
actions or inaction to the extent that such indemnification or
exculpation is contrary to public policy.
It should be noted, however, that New Jersey courts have considered other factors in evaluating the enforceability of such provisions, including the good faith of the party seeking enforcement, 6
the unconscionability of the contract 7 and equality of bargaining
power."8 In light of the courts' consideration of these other factors, if borrower's counsel includes an exception to the remedies
opinion that addresses only the potential unenforceability of an indemnity provision due to violations of public policy, borrower's
counsel could be deemed to be rendering an opinion, for example, that such provisions will not be held unenforceable due to any
inequality in bargaining power. Indemnification provisions are
often included in loan documentation as "boilerplate" types of provisions and such provisions are generally not of substantial importance to the lender in deciding whether or not to extend the
credit. Accordingly, even where such other factors may not be of
concern, the better approach is for borrower's counsel to include
an exception to the general enforceability of such provisions.

11.

Waivers.

(a)

Waiver of Right to Jury Trial.

Almost every commercial lender requires that its borrowers
waive the right to ajury trial. Generally, such waivers are enforceable to the extent that they are made expressly and with a thorough
understanding of the waiver.8 9 One New Jersey court has held that
86 Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers State Univ., 90 N.J. 253, 447 A.2d 906
(1982).
87 Broadway, 90 N.J. at 270, 447 A.2d 914; Tannock v. New Jersey Bell Telephone
Co., 212 N.J. Super. 506, 515 A.2d 815 (Law Div. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in par 223
N.J. Super. 1, 537 A.2d 1307 (App. Div. 1986).
88 Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 48 N.J. 483, 226 A.2d 602 (1967), on remand 97 N.J.
Super. 116, 234 A.2d 503 (Law Div. 1967), affd sub. nom., Natell v. Henley, 103 N.J.
Super. 161, 246 A.2d 749 (App. Div. 1968); Hy-Grade Oil Co., 138 N.J. Super. 112;
Tannock, 212 N.J. Super. 506.
89 State v. Wyman, 232 N.J. Super. 565, 557 A.2d 1043 (App. Div. 1989); State v.
Paolino, 110 N.J. Super. 284, 265 A.2d 398 (App. Div. 1970). The express and thorough understanding standard has only been enunciated in criminal cases. There is
little New Jersey case law as to the form and sufficiency of jury trial waivers in civil
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a jury trial waiver was unenforceable where it was inconspicuous in
an adhesion contract and was entered into without assistance of
counsel.90 This decision is consistent with the standard enunciated
in other New Jersey criminal cases. 9 ' Because the decisions which
hold such provisions unenforceable do so on the basis that such
provisions violate public policy92 and because the right to a jury
trial is considered a fundamental right,9 3 there is understandably a
great deal of hesitancy on the part of borrower's counsel in rendering remedies opinions with respect to such provisions. 9 4 Accordingly, borrower's counsel should be permitted to include an
exception for the enforceability of jury trial waivers to the extent
that such provisions violate public policy.
It should also be recognized, however, that in connection with
high-end transactions, especially those involving lenders unfamiliar
with New Jersey law, borrower's counsel may need to render an
opinion as to the enforceability of ajury trial waiver. If the opinion
is carefully limited to the state of the law at the time the opinion is
delivered, borrower's counsel should be able to evaluate whether
the waiver was express and thoroughly understood by the borrower. In a situation where there is extremely unequal bargaining
power, however, it may be unclear whether the waiver is voluntary.95 The courts may deem that an opinion as to the enforceability of such a provision includes a qualitative evaluation as to
whether the bargaining power of the parties is equal enough for
the provision to be considered voluntary and therefore
enforceable.

cases. However, New Jersey civil case law has held contractual jury trial waivers to be
enforceable, without identifying separate criteria for enforceability in civil cases.
Franklin Discount Co. v. Ford, 27 N.J. 473, 492-93, 143 A.2d 161,172 (1958); Sexton v.
Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 55 N.J.L. 85, 101-02 (1913).
90 Fairfield Leasing v. Techni-Graphics, 256 N.J. Super. 538, 607 A.2d 703 (Law
Div. 1992).
91 Wyman, 232 N.J. Super. at 568, 557 A.2d at 1045; Paolino, 110 N.J. Super. at 284,
265 A.2d at 398.
92 Fairfield Leasing, 256 NJ. Super. at 543, 607 A.2d at 706.
93 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972). David T. Russof, ContractualJury Waivers:
Their Use in Reducing Lender Liability, 110 BANKING LJ. 4 (1993).
94 It should be noted that at least one state's highest court has held that all prelitigation contractual waivers of a right to jury trial are unenforceable. Bank South v.
Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799 (1994).
95 National Equip. Rental v. Hendrix, 566 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977); Rodenbur v.
Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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(b)

Waiver of Statute of Limitations.

Opinions as to the enforceability of waivers of statutes of limitations are particularly troublesome in New Jersey. No state court
has ruled on the enforceability of such waivers for over 40 years. 96
The weight of the authority in other jurisdictions holds such waivers unenforceable where they are included as a part of the original
obligations.9 7 The last state court to rule on the issue held against
the party attempting to enforce the waiver and cited a Massachusetts Supreme Court case holding such clauses contrary to public
policy.9 8 Shortly after that case was published, a Rutgers Law Review
casenote construed the case as demonstrating how such provisions
"may be held invalid and void in NewJersey." 99 There is, therefore,
a substantial risk that the next court to rule on the issue in New
Jersey will hold such provisions unenforceable as violative of public
policy.'
Where mid-market or high-end loan documents contain
express waivers of statutes of limitations or, for example, other text
waiving "every benefit, exemption or privilege under any law now
or hereafter to be enforced," 01' borrower's counsel should include
the following exception to the remedies opinion:
The opinions expressed herein are subject to the unenforceability of provisions purporting, directly or indirectly, to provide for
a waiver of the benefit of any statute of limitations to the extent
that such provision violates public policy.
(c)

Other Waivers.

Various other waivers may also be unenforceable in certain circumstances. Such waivers which are found in loan documents in96 The last case decided on the issue under New Jersey law was decided by a federal district court. Sherwood Jewelers-Newark v. Philadelphia Nat. Ins. Co., 102 F.
Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1952).
97

IA

ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS,

§ 218 (2d ed. 1963 and

Supp. 1993); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON AND WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREZATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTR CTS § 183 (3d ed. 1961 and Supp. 1979).
98 Hudson County Nat. Bank v. Simpson, 5 N.J. Super. 135, 68 A.2d 542 (App. Div.
1949).
99 Recent Cases, Contracts-Statute of Limitations-Effect of Waiver, 4 RUTGERS L. REV.
508, 510 (1950).
100 The court in Hudson County National Bank cited the United States Supreme
Court's enunciation of the policy favoring statutes of limitations as "practical and
pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen
from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost." Hudson County Nat'l Bank, 5 N.J. Super. at 138,
68 A.2d at 544 (quoting Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314

(1945)).
101 Hudson County Nat'l Bank, 5 N.J. Super. at 139, 68 A.2d at 544.
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clude waivers of moratorium laws,1"' waivers of errors, defects and
imperfections in proceedings, 10 3 waivers of the benefits of any exemption from civil process, 1°4 waivers of rights to notice, 105 waivers
of appraisal or valuation rights10 6 and waivers of marshalling of as102 There is no New Jersey case law directly addressing the issue of whether waivers
of moratorium laws are enforceable. Nevertheless, because moratoriums are created
for the benefit of the public generally, it is likely that any such waiver is either unenforceable as a violation of public policy or is meaningless since the borrower in a
commercial loan transaction is not the only party who may assert such rights. For
example, the New Jersey district courts did have the opportunity to rule on a similar
matter relating to the ability of a German corporation to sue a United States corporation during World War II in Farbenfabriken Bayer A. G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.
Farbenfabriken Bayer A. G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 251 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 957 (1958). In that case, it is unlikely that the district court would
have precluded the defendant U.S. corporation from asserting the Trading With the
Enemy Act as a defense to the suit, had the plaintiff German corporation asserted that
the defendant U.S. corporation had waived its moratorium rights.
103 Errors in service of process can delay a lender in enforcing its rights. The New
Jersey courts have not ruled on the issue as to whether such a waiver is enforceable.
However, cases that have discussed service of process have indicated that such service
is a prerequisite to jurisdiction and that the relevant rules must be strictly observed.
Ammond v. Lafayette, 63 N.J. Super. 86, 163 A.2d 721 (App. Div. 1960). Accordingly,
it is unlikely that a court would strictly enforce any such waiver that would permit
jurisdiction over a party without strict compliance with the court rules.
104 Certain statutes prohibit the exercise of civil remedies against certain types of
property. Cemeteries, for example, are exempt from foreclosure by New Jersey
courts. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 8A:5-12 (West 1988 and Supp. 1994). Abra-May Cemetery
Sales Co. v. Degel Yehudo Cemetery Corp. of NewJersey, 92 N.J. Super. 365, 223 A.2d
507 (Ch. Div. 1966). Similarly, federal statutes that prohibit certain transfers of property may be construed to exempt such property from civil process. The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), for example, has been held to prohibit
transfer of benefits payable under any employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)
(West Supp. 1993); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 394 A.2d 153 (Ch. Div. 1978).
Similarly, the Medicare and Medicaid statutes prohibit the transfer of accounts receivable from the governmental agencies implementing the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (32) (B) (1988) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(c) (1988)
(Medicare). In both cases, it is likely that such statutory limitations are not waivable
by the person or entity holding the relevant property rights.
105 Certain statutes contain notice requirements that are not waivable. Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code requires that the secured party give the debtor notice
of any disposition of collateral. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-504(3) (West 1962 and Supp.
1994). The Code also expressly states that this requirement is not waivable. N.J. STAT.
ANN. 12A:9-501 (3) (a) (1962 and Supp. 1994). See, e.g., Mayv. Womens Bank, N.A., 14
UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 26 (Colo. 1991) (holding guarantor is entitled to all rights and
protections afforded to a debtor under the UCC, including non-waivability of notice
of a default sale).
106 New Jersey permits obligors on foreclosed real property to dispute the amount
of any deficiency with evidence of the fair market value of the property at the time of
the foreclosure sale. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-3 (West 1987 and Supp. 1994). A mortgagor's ability to waive the right to credit for the fair market value is extremely limited. 30 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM & SAUL TISCHLER, NEWJERSEY PRAcrICE 357-59 (West
1975 and Supp. 1994).
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sets.10 7 Since most of these types of waivers are not material to the
ultimate credit decision of the lender, borrower's counsel should
not be expected to opine as to the enforceability of such waivers.
This is particularly true in connection with mid-market
transactions.
12.

Laches (Failure/Delayin Excersing Rights).

One of the "boilerplate" provisions found in almost every loan
agreement is a clause which provides that any failure or delay of
the lender to exercise its rights will not operate as a waiver of such
right. New Jersey case law supports the proposition that a party's
delay in exercising or failure to exercise certain rights may operate
as a waiver of such rights.108 Although the doctrine of laches is
generally considered an equitable doctrine,' ° 9 it may also serve a
public interest function similar to that of statutes of limitations. In
fact, the most recent case decided by the highest New Jersey state
court to address the public policy behind the doctrine of laches
indicated that the policy behind the doctrine is to discourage stale
claims.'1 0 A NewJersey court, therefore, may hold a waiver of such
rights unenforceable on the basis that it would violate public policy. Borrower's counsel should, therefore, include the following
exception to the remedies opinion in any opinion rendered on an
agreement containing such a clause:
The opinions expressed herein are subject to the non-enforceability of provisions to the effect that failure to exercise or delay
in exercising rights or remedies will not operate as a waiver of
the rights or remedies.
107 Marshalling of assets is an equitable principle which is customarily applied by
one of two creditors of a common debtor. In re Elsinore Shore Associates, 91 B.R. 238
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1988). In fact, it has been held that the doctrine is only applicable
between creditors. Johnson v. Lentini, 66 N.J. Super. 398, 169 A.2d 208 (Ch. Div.
1961). As such, it appears nonsensical that a lender would require a waiver of marshalling of assets since it is more appropriately asserted by another creditor of the
borrower. Since no court has ruled on the enforceability of a waiver to assert marshalling of assets as a defense, it is not a matter on which an opinion may be easily
rendered.
108 McLaughlin v. Dredge Gloucester, 230 F. Supp. 623 (D.N.J. 1964); Finley v.
United States, 130 F. Supp. 788 (D.N.J. 1955); Pfeffer v. Delran Twp., 159 N.J. Super.
497, 388 A.2d 642 (Law Div. 1978).
109 Pierce v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 934 (D.N.J. 1957); Auciello v.
Stauffer, 58 N.J.Super. 522, 156 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 1960); Fairken Assoc. v. Hutchin,
223 N.J. Super. 274, 538 A.2d 465 (Law Div. 1987); Pfeffer v. Delran Twp., 159 N.J.
Super. at 497, 388 A.2d 642 (Law Div. 1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howard Say. Inst., 127
N.J. Super. 479, 317 A.2d 770 (Ch. Div. 1974).
110 Gladden v. Board of Trustees of Public Emp. Retirement Sys., 171 N.J. Super.
363, 409 A.2d 294 (App. Div. 1979).
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS

Types of Opinions.

There are only three types of opinions with respect to security
interests: (1) opinions as to the creation of a security interest;"'
(2) opinions as to the perfection of the security interest; and (3)
opinions as to the priority of the security interest. The scope of
these opinions in mid-market transactions varies significantly from
the scope of these opinions in high-end transactions.
In mid-market transactions, the type of collateral with respect
to which the lender requires an opinion is generally limited to
property covered by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC). In this case, the borrower's counsel customarily limits his
opinion to specific types of property (e.g. accounts, inventory and
equipment). In addition, the opinion is limited to the creation
and perfection of a security interest. An opinion with respect to
priority is not customarily required.
In high-end transactions, the borrower's counsel may be expected to offer opinions with respect to many more issues. The
opinion may cover all of the property of the borrower, including
property expressly excluded from coverage under Section 9-104 of
Article 9 of the UCC. If so, borrower's counsel must expressly
identify those types of property with respect to which he is not rendering an opinion. Even in high-end transactions, it is generally
not necessary for the borrower's counsel to give an opinion as to all
types of property." 2 This can be extremely difficult and time con111 See infra notes 127-136 (relating to the creation and attachment of security
interests).

112 Set forth below is a list of types of property which are only rarely an important
part of the lender's collateral base.
(a) consumer goods, farm products, equipment used in farming operations,
crops, timber, the unborn young of animals, minerals and the like prior to extraction
(including oil and gas) and general intangibles or accounts arising or resulting from
or relating to the sale of any of the foregoing;

(b) uncertificated securities;
(c) documents whether negotiable or non-negotiable and goods covered by
documents;
(d) beneficial interests in a trust or a decedent's estate;
(e) letters of credit;
(f) goods, instruments or money held by a bailee;
(g) items which are subject to a statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a national or international registration or a national or international certificate of title for the perfection of a security interest therein or which specifies a place
of filing different from that specified in the UCC for filing to perfect such security
interest;
(h) items which are subject to a certificate of title under a statute of any state;
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suming and would require a careful analysis of the borrower's business. Furthermore, because the collateral in such circumstances
usually includes after-acquired property, the borrower's counsel, in
drafting his opinion, should realize that the opinion may also cover
types of property which the borrower may reasonably acquire in
the future.
B.

PersonalProperty Outside UCC Article 9.

In rendering an opinion as to all property of the borrower, it
is important to be aware of laws other than Article 9 of the UCC
that may apply to the creation or perfection of a security interest in
certain types of property. Several other articles of the UCC address
security interests, liens or assignments of property either exclusively or coextensively with Article 9."11 In addition to the UCC,
other state law may apply to liens and security interests in certain
types of property. 1 4
Of particular concern are licenses and permits which are "general intangibles" under Article 9. Most NewJersey law dealing with
licenses and permits either does not address security interests or
expressly precludes their assignment. 115 Other types of property
which may be covered by federal laws include intellectual property
(e.g., patents,'" 6 trademarks," 7 and copyright)," 8 aircraft,' 9 ves(i) after-acquired contract rights to the extent the grant of the security interest
therein is restricted or prohibited by the terms thereof or otherwise by law.
To the extent that the opinion relates to the perfection of the security interest by
filing, the items listed in (b), (c), (d), (g) and (h) above are expressly identified as
items which are not perfectable by filing. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-302 (West 1962 and
Supp. 1994).
113 Article 2 addresses consignment sales and the rights of creditors in all types of
personal property. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:2-326 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994). Article 4
provides for the creation of certain security interests in bank deposits. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 12A:4-208 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994). Article 5 addresses assignments and interests in letters of credit. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:5-110, 5-116 (West 1962 & Supp.
1994). Article 7 covers liens in goods covered by a document of title. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 12A:7-209, 7-307 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994). Article 8 governs the creation of
liens in both certificated and uncertificated securities. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:8-313, 8321.
114 See, e.g., Boat Ownership Certificate Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12:7-1 - 7-6 (West
1990) and Motor Vehicle Certificate of Ownership Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:10-1 - 1037 (West 1990 and Supp. 1994); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-7 (West 1988) (providing
for a lien on aircraft causing injury to persons or property).
115 For example, liquor licenses are expressly non-transferable. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 33:1-26 (West 1994).
116 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988). SeeJohn L. Mesrobian & Kenneth R. Schaefer, Security
Interests in Intellectual Property, 125 NEW JERsEY L.J. 336 (1990) (addressing whether
federal patent and trademark law preempts Article 9 of the UCC).
117 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (1988 and Supp. V).
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sels,' 2° rolling stock, 12 1 certain types of transportation collateral,122
ERISA plan benefits, 12 1 Medicare accounts receivable, 124 Medicaid
and accounts receivable from federal govaccounts receivable 125
1 26
agencies.
ernmental
C. Assumptions.
1.

Creation and Attachment of Security Interest.

It is curiously rare for borrower's counsel to be asked to
render an opinion as to the attachment of a security interest under

New Jersey law. 1 27 It is commonly accepted, however, for borrower's counsel to render an opinion as to the creation of a security interest. 1 28 The New Jersey UCC does not clearly distinguish
between the terms "creation" and "attachment" as they relate to
security interests. 129 It is clear that for a security interest to attach,
there must be a security agreement, the giving of value, and the
borrower must have rights in the collateral.'i 0 The UCC does not,
however, address the prerequisites for the creation of a security interest. Therefore, the UCC, in and of itself, is unclear as to
118 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 205 (1988 and Supp. V). SeeWeinberg and Woodward, Legislative Process and Commercial Law, 48 Bus. LAw. 437 (1993) (discussing the relationship
between Article 9 of the UCC and the Copyright Act of 1976).
119 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1988 and Supp. V).
120 Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 951-53 (1988 and Supp. V).
121 49 U.S.C. § 20(c) (1988 and Supp. V).
122 49 U.S.C. § 11304 (1988 and Supp. V).
123 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (West Supp. 1993); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 52,
394 A.2d 153, 155 (Ch. Div 1978).
124 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(c) (1988 and Supp. V).
125 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32)(B) (1988 and Supp. V).
126 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1988 and Supp. V); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1988 and Supp. V). It
should be noted that security interests in accounts receivable from the United States
Postal Service are not governed by the Federal Assignment of Claims Act. Rather,
they are expressly covered by the statutes governing the U.S. Post Office. 39 U.S.C.
§ 101 - 5605 (1988 and Supp. V).
127 It is unclear why it is customary in New Jersey to request an opinion as to the
"creation" of the security interest rather than the "attachment" of the security interest.
The fact that the UCC is written in terms of "attachment" makes the rationale for the
practice even less clear.
128 Security Interest Report, supra note 22, at 372.
129 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-105(1)(1) uses the term "create" in defining the term
"security agreement." In that context it appears that "creates" is intended to be synonymous with the phrase "provides for." This would suggest that an opinion that a
security agreement creates a security interest merely means that the security agreement contains a provision expressing the intent of the debtor to grant a security interest to the secured party. Although this may be an accurate literal interpretation of
the use of the term "create" under the UCC, New Jersey case law clarifies that this
interpretation is too narrow. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
130

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 12A:9-203 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
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whether a security interest can be created without first having
attached.
Certain authority seems to suggest that an opinion as to the
creation of a security interest tells the recipient something less

than an opinion that the security interest has attached.' 3 ' Experienced NewJersey lawyers, however, will render a creation opinion,
but insist that they be permitted to include assumptions that clearly

relate to the attachment of a security interest. Such assumptions
include assumptions as to the legal right of the lender to perform
its obligations,1

32

assumptions as to the giving of value13

sumptions as to the borrower's title to the

collateral.'3 4

3

and as-

Although

there is a lack of clarity in the UCC as to distinctions between creation and attachment of security interests, New Jersey case law has
consistently included the UCC criteria for the attachment of a security interest 135 in determining whether a security interest has
been created. 1 36 Accordingly, under NewJersey law, it is misleading to suggest that a creation opinion is somehow different from an

attachment opinion.
(a)

Legal Right of Lender.

In mid-market transactions, borrower's counsel is almost never
expected to render any opinion relating to the lender. 137 The se131 FitzGibbon and Glazer state that an opinion as to the creation of a security
interest covers the status of the agreement (i.e., that it provides for a security interest,
has been duly executed and delivered and is duly authorized), the reasonable identification of the collateral, and that the security agreement is in effect at the time the
opinion is delivered. LEGAL OPINIONS, supra note 4, at 379-86. They suggest that a
creation opinion does not confirm that the debtor has rights in the collateral, but that
an attachment opinion does include such a confirmation. Id. at 377.
132 See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (regarding "Legal Right of
Lender").
133 See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (regarding "Giving of Value").
134 See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (regarding "Title to Collateral").
'35 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-204 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
136 The New Jersey courts have construed the UCC to provide that for a security
interest to be created: (1) a security agreement must be entered into; (2) the agreement must be in writing or the creditor must be in possession of the collateral; (3) the
debtor must have rights in the collateral; and (4) the secured party must have given
value. In Re Maple Contractors, Inc., 172 N.J. Super. 348, 353, 411 A.2d 1186, 1189
(Law Div. 1979); Doyle v. Northrop Corp., D.C., 455 F. Supp. 1318 (D.N.J. 1978); New
Jersey Bank (Nat. Ass'n) v. Community Association/Farms, Inc., 666 F.2d 813, 818 (3d
Cir. 1981). See also First County Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Canna, 124 N.J. Super. 154,
157, 305 A.2d 442, 444 (App. Div. 1973) (stating in dicta that a security interest cannot be created absent an agreement that it attach).
137 In high-end transactions, especially those involving foreign lenders, it may be
necessary for borrower's counsel to render an opinion as to certain New Jersey state
laws which may be applicable to the lenders. Under the New York approach, how-
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curity interest opinion, as with all other opinions generally, addresses only whether the security interest is enforceable against the

borrower. Borrower's counsel should, therefore, expressly assume
the power of the lender under all applicable laws and regulations
to perform its obligations under the loan documents.1 3
This assumption is customarily accepted by lenders for three
reasons. First, under general principles of contract law, in order to
form an enforceable contract, there must be mutuality between the
parties.13 9 Second, the assumption relieves borrower's counsel
from evaluating the complex laws and regulations governing the
lender and whether or not the lender is in compliance with its own
governing regulations.1 4 ° Finally, under the New Jersey UCC, as
prerequisites to the attachment of a security interest, the borrower
must have signed a security agreement that contains a description
of the collateral, 4 ' and the security interest provided under the
ever, these opinions would have to be expressly stated and not merely implied by the
remedies opinion since, under the New York approach, the remedies opinion would
not cover regulatory statutes applicable solely to the recipient. TribarRemedies Report,
supra note 11, at 967.
138 This assumption is of particular value to the borrower's counsel and of particular concern to the lender where the lender is a foreign bank. Under New Jersey law,
foreign banks are generally precluded from transacting business in the state. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-316 (West 1984 and Supp. 1994). The statute further provides
that foreign banks may not maintain an action arising out of any such prohibited
transaction. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-330 (West 1985 and Supp. 1994). In Arab Aftican
International Bank v. Epstein, a New Jersey partnership borrowed $3,250,000 from a
foreign bank. The loan documents provided that they would be governed by New
York law. When the borrower defaulted on the loan, the foreign bank attempted to
commence a foreclosure action. The borrower asserted the NewJersey foreign banking laws as a defense to the foreclosure and was successful in precluding the bank
from enforcing its loan. The bank then commenced a suit alleging that the borrower's counsel committed malpractice in rendering an opinion that the loan documents were enforceable. Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 958 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1992). The district court held that the NewJersey foreign banking laws precluded the
bank's malpractice action since the action arose out of the prohibited transaction.
Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, No. 90-2461, 1992 WL 184362 (D.N.J. July 21,
1992). On appeal, the Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether, based on the extent of Arab African's business in NewJersey, the application of the New Jersey Banking Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-315 - 332 (the "Act")
would impose a burden on interstate commerce that outweighs New Jersey's interest
in enforcing the Act. Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1993).
Since such an analysis is factually intensive and such facts would ordinarily not be
known to borrower's counsel, borrower's counsel is, therefore, well advised to expressly assume in its legal opinion that the lender has complied with all laws required
to make the loan.
139 2 ARTHUR LINrON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTrs § 152-170 (2d ed. 1963).
140 This is a task which would be unduly burdensome and is usually only the concern of the loan officers representing the lender.
141 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-203(1) (a) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994). In the alternative, the New Jersey UCC permits this prerequisite to be satisfied if the collateral is in
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security agreement must have become enforceable against the bor14 2
rower with respect to the collateral.
The remedies opinion with respect to the loan documents
containing the security agreement is, therefore, an integral part of
the opinion that the security interest has attached. It is important
to note, however, that, under the UCC, for the security interest to
attach, it is only necessary for the security interest (i.e., the security
agreement) to become enforceable against the borrower. 14 3 The
opinion that the security interest has attached does not require
that the borrower's rights against the lender with respect to the
security interest relationship be enforceable. The assumption as to
the enforceability of the loan documents against the lender, and
the right and ability of the lender to perform its obligations under
the loan documents, does not, therefore, undermine the opinion
that the security agreement has attached.
(b)

Giving of Value.

An unusually customary assumption expressed in security interest opinions is the assumption that value has been given. Under
the NewJersey UCC, a security interest cannot attach until "value is
given." 1" Although the assumption is often made by borrower's
counsel and equally as often tacitly accepted by lenders, such an
assumption is unnecessary and could arguably undermine the
value of the remedies opinion. Under the UCC, consideration necessary to support a contract is all that is needed for value to have
been given.14 5 In rendering a remedies opinion, the borrower's
counsel is required to make a legal determination that there is conthe possession of the secured party pursuant to an agreement. Id. If the security
interest covers crops or timber, the UCC requires that the description of the collateral
also include a description of the real estate where the crops or timber is located. Id.
142 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-203(2) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
143 "A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the debtor
with respect to the collateral." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-203(2) (West 1962 and Supp.
1994).
144 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-203(1)(b) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
145 The concept of the giving of value was originally incorporated in Section 9204(1) of the NewJersey UCC. The NewJersey Study Comment published in connection with the adoption of the UCC in New Jersey stated that "[v]alue as used in this
section is defined in § 1-201(44) and includes, inter alia,any consideration sufficient
to support a simple contract." New Jersey Study Comment No. 3 to original N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:9-204(1) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994). The requirement of the giving of
value has since been moved. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-203(1) (b) (West 1962 and Supp.
1994). Under Article 1 of the UCC, a person is deemed to have given "value" if he
acquires rights in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-201(44)(d) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
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sideration necessary to support a binding contract. 146 If borrower's
counsel assumes that value has been given, such an assumption
could also be construed to include an assumption that there is con147 thereby
sideration necessary for validity of the loan documents,
1 48
diminishing the value of the remedies opinion.
(c)

Title to Collateral.

Another assumption often made by borrower's counsel in rendering security interest opinions is that the borrower has good title
to the collateral. Under the New Jersey UCC, a security interest in
collateral will not attach unless the borrower has "rights in the collateral."' 4 9 Although the issue of whether the borrower owns the
collateral may be a legal one, the time-consuming investigation and
related expenses which would be necessary to confirm a borrower's
ownership of specific property is usually beyond the scope of most
mid-market and high-end transactions. For this reason, it is commonly accepted for borrower's New Jersey counsel to assume that
the borrower has rights in the collateral. This assumption may take
two forms. It may be stated as a "stand alone" provision in the
opinion letter or it may be incorporated directly into the security
interest opinion. 5
Although it is customary to permit borrower's counsel to assume that the borrower has rights in the collateral, the express
statement of the assumption in the borrower's counsel's opinion
may be unnecessary. 1 5 ' Loan documents very often contain a rep146

ABA Accord, supra note 1, at 198;
at 200.

LEGAL OPINIONS, supra note 4,
147 See supra note 122.
148 Although some authority

FIELD

& RYAN, supra note 34, at 4-1, 4-2, 4-9;

has suggested that an assumption as to the giving of
value may be appropriate where the sole value is a commitment to lend which is so
illusory as not to support a simple contract, such an assumption in almost all cases will
be unacceptable to lender's counsel since the lender will be looking to borrower's
counsel to render a remedies opinion as to the other underlying agreements. Security
Interest Report, supra note 22, at 373.
149 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-203(1)(c) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
150 The "stand alone" version of the assumption is often stated as follows: "We express no opinion as to the borrower's rights in and title to any of the collateral with
respect to which a security interest is purported to be granted pursuant to the loan
documents." The assumption can also be expressed as an integral part of the security
interest opinion as follows: "The security agreement creates in favor of the lender a
valid security interest in all right, title and interest of the borrower in the collateral."
151 The NewYork practice appears to presume that an opinion as to the creation of
a security interest does not include an implication as to the borrower's rights in the
collateral. Security Interest Report, supra note 22, at 373-74. Unfortunately, there is no
case law supporting this presumption and failure to expressly include an exception as
to the borrower's rights in the collateral could potentially expose borrower's counsel
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resentation of the borrower that the borrower owns the collateral
free of liens. It is also customary for borrower's counsel to rely on
the representations of the borrower in the loan documents. In
such cases, the assumption will be unnecessary since the borrower's
opinion incorporates reliance upon the representation of the borrower as to the borrower's rights in the collateral.
2.

Collateral Will Not Become Fixtures.

In rendering an opinion as to the perfection of a security interest in assets where the collateral does not include fixtures, borrower's counsel will often include an assumption that the collateral
will not become fixtures.1 52 Such an assumption relates only to the
perfection of a security interest. If collateral existing at the time
the transaction is consummated later becomes fixtures, the lender
may lose its perfection in such items. Under the UCC, in order to
perfect a security interest in fixtures, it is necessary to file a financing statement with the county clerk 153 which describes not only the
1 54
fixtures, but also the property on which the fixtures are located.
Although lenders often file financing statements with both the Secretary of State and the county clerk, they may not include a description of the real estate. Accordingly, the county clerk filing
would be insufficient to maintain the perfected security interest in
goods that became fixtures.
D. Exceptions.
1.
(a)

Creation.
Rights of Third Parties.

Article 9 of the UCC expressly permits the assignment of accounts and further provides that any contract provision purporting
to prohibit assignment is unenforceable.155 All accounts, however,
are subject to any defenses and other contractual restrictions between the borrower and the account debtor. 156 While such defenses or restrictions may not preclude the creation of a security
interest in the accounts, they may affect the lender's remedies or
to liability to the opinion recipient who is relying on borrower's counsel's legal opinion that a valid security interest has been created.
152 The assumption is customarily worded as follows: "We have assumed that no
collateral consisting of goods will constitute fixtures."
153 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-401 (1) (b) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
154 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-402(5) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
155 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-318(4) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
156 FIELD & RYAN, supra note 34, at 7-7, 7-8.
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even the amount of the account payable to the borrower.
Although the concern is most commonly stated with respect to accounts, it is also applicable to other contract rights that are included in the collateral. 15 7 Therefore, borrower's counsel will
sometimes seek to include an exception which provides:
The opinions expressed herein are subject to the rights of lessees or other account debtors in any of the collateral, the terms
of the leases or other contracts between the borrower and such
lessees or account debtors, and any claims or defenses of such
lessees or account debtors against the borrower arising under or
outside such leases or other agreements.
Such an exception is designed to permit the borrower's counsel to render the remedies opinion and the opinions as to the creation and perfection of the security interest without detailed due
diligence concerning each contractual relationship. This is appropriate where contract rights are not the basis of the collateral.
Even where accounts are a substantial portion of the collateral, it is
usually impractical to require borrower's counsel to review every
aspect of the borrower's relationship with its account debtors or to
obtain estoppel certificates waiving defenses from such third
parties.
(b)

Adequacy of Description.

The adequacy of the description of the collateral is an important aspect to lenders since it is a fundamental element of the creation of a valid security agreement, ' "s the formal financing
statement prerequisite to filing'5 9 and necessary to put third parties on notice of the items intended to be covered by the financing
statement.16° New Jersey, however, is almost devoid of case law
As previously discussed, the opinion as to the creation of a security interest is
implicit in an opinion that a security agreement is enforceable. See supra notes 137-43
and accompanying text (regarding the "Legal Right of Lender"). Accordingly, an
opining attorney is well advised to include an exception for the rights of third parties
where the collateral includes contract rights. Where the collateral includes accounts,
the need for the exception is less clear since the UCC expressly provides that prohibitions against the assignment of accounts are unenforceable. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9401(1) (b) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994). Where the collateral includes accounts, inclusion of the exception in the opinion serves to put the recipient on notice that the
account collateral may be subject to certain defenses and restrictions and thereby
reduces the likelihood that the opinion could be considered misleading as to the
rights of the secured party in the accounts.
158 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-203(1)(a) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
159 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-402(1) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
160 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-110 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
157
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construing the UCC description requirements. 61 All that can be
gleaned from NewJersey case law is that an accurate serial number
type of description will be held to reasonably identify the collateral. 6 ' Case law in other jurisdictions has indicated that the use of
the UCC definitions for "equipment," "inventory" and "accounts"
may be sufficient to give notice to third parties of the intended
collateral.1 6 Although these terms are deemed sufficient in other
jurisdictions, they have not been expressly deemed sufficient either
under NewJersey case law or under the UCC. Furthermore, other
UCC defined terms (e.g., general intangibles) have been criticized
as not permitting reasonable identification.' 6 4 Case law in other
jurisdictions (and perhaps in New Jersey) has held broad descrip65
tions to be insufficient.
Although it is customary for New Jersey lawyers to use definitions of UCC terms in describing collateral, whether such a practice provides for a sufficient description is arguably unclear in New
Jersey. While an opinion is not a guaranty, such an opinion cannot
be given on the basis of New Jersey law and can only be given by
reference to other law. In order for a description to be sufficient,
the UCC requires that it reasonably identify the thing described.' 6 6
It is the author's experience that NewJersey practitioners are split
as to whether they will render an opinion as to the sufficiency of a
description. While lenders will customarily want assurance that the
description of the collateral is adequate, 167 due to the status of New
161 See In reLake Hopatcong Water Corp., 15 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (holding NewJersey board of public utility commissioners approval of mortgage on a utility
plant was insufficient to authorize security interest in accounts, inventory, contract
rights and fixtures); In re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1966) (upholding validity of security interest where trust receipts in appliance inventory described appliances); National-Dime -Bank of Shamokin v. Cleveland Bros. Equipment
Co., 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 511, 74 Dauph. 194 (1961) (holding a serial number type description of backhoe to reasonably identify the collateral).
162 National-DimeBank, 74 Dauph. at 194.
163 See FIELD & RYAN,supra note 34, at 8-3, 8-4 (citing In re Sarex Corp., 509 F.2d 689
(2d Cir. 1975) (equipment); In reVarney Wood Products, Inc., 458 F.2d 435 (4th Cir.
1972) (accounts); In re Bazaar de la Cuisine Int'l, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1049
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1976) (inventory); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. B.J. Dodge Fiat, Inc., 475
N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1985) (accounts).
164 See FIELD & RYAN,supra note 34, at 8-3, 8-4; LEGAL OPINIONS, supranote 4, at 383;
California Secured TransactionsReport, supra note 3, at 808.
165 In re E.P.G. Computer Servs., Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1084 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1976). See also CaliforniaSecured Transactions Report, supra note 3, at 808. Similarly, a
bankruptcy court sitting in New Jersey has held that the phrase "utility plant" was
insufficient to cover accounts, inventory, contract rights and fixtures of the plant. In
re Lake Hopatcong Water Corp., 15 B.R. at 418-20.
166 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-110 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
167 FIELD & RYAN, supra note 34, at 8-4, 8-5.
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Jersey law (except where the collateral consists of property which is
specifically identifiable by serial number or another similar
method) it is beyond the scope of borrower's counsel's representation to confirm that the description reasonably identifies what the
lender intends to take as collateral.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, based on a simple comparison
of the documents, borrower's counsel should be able to opine that
the description of the collateral contained in the security agreement should not be deemed insufficient on the grounds that it differs from the description in the financing statement.1 6
(c)

Buyer in Ordinary Course § 9-307.

Section 9-307 of the UCC provides for three exceptions pursuant to which an otherwise secured party's security interest may be
defeated: (1) a buyer in the ordinary course;' 6 9 (2) a buyer of consumer goods;1 7 0 and (3) a buyer of collateral subject to security
interests for future advances. 17 1 The buyer in the ordinary course
exception provides that a buyer in the ordinary course 172 takes free
of the perfected security interest of a secured party, even if the
buyer knows of the existence of the security interest. 173 The sec168 In rendering a security interest opinion, a form of compromise exception may
read as follows:
No opinion is expressed as to whether phrases such as "other property,"
"all property," "all real, personal and mixed property," and similar
phrases and the phrase "general intangibles" are sufficient descriptions
so as to provide reasonable identification of the property intended to be
covered thereby; however, we do not believe that the description of the
collateral set forth in the financing statements would be deemed to be
insufficient on the grounds that it differs from the description in the
security agreement.
This compromise expresses the concern as to overly broad phrases and the use of
the term "general intangibles," but provides the lender some comfort that the transcription from the security agreement to the financing statement was done accurately.
It must be noted, however, that such a compromise is not necessarily recommended,
since New Jersey law is deficient as to the meaning of sufficiency of a description of
collateral and since decisions in the other jurisdictions is only of limited value.
169 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-307(1) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
170 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-307(2) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
171 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-307(3) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
172 Persons buying farm products from farmers are excluded from this exception.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-307(1) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
173 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-307(1) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994). The statute references Section 1-201(9) for the definition of "Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business." Under that section, such a buyer must buy without knowledge of the security
interest of the secured party. Section 9-307, however, expressly provides that a buyer
in the ordinary course takes free of a perfected security interest even though he
knows of the security interest. Id. The apparent conflict between the two sections is
resolved by reference to the comment to Section 9-307. The comment clarifies that a
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ond exception regarding consumer goods only applies to consumer goods in which the secured party holds a purchase money
security interest. 17 4 The final exception permits a buyer (who is
not a buyer in the ordinary course) to take free of any security
interest in two circumstances. First, if the secured party makes a
future advance after becoming aware of the sale of the collateral,
the buyer will take the collateral free of any security interest that
17 5
would otherwise have attached in respect of the future advance.
Second, 45 days after the purchase, any future advances made by
the secured party are not secured by the collateral sold.17
The plain language of the statute provides that the buyer in
1 77
each of these circumstances "takes free of the security interest."
Accordingly, these provisions operate not merely to subordinate
the interest of the secured party, but rather to void the security
interest altogether. Although, notwithstanding Section 9-307, a security interest may be created and perfected prior to the sale to a
buyer in the ordinary course, New Jersey lawyers often include an
advisory exception for the rights of buyers pursuant to Section 9307.178 By including such an exception, borrower's counsel is notifying the lender that the law provides circumstances under which
the lender's security interest will be treated as if it were not created
or perfected. This exception is included to prevent the opinion
from being misleading.
buyer takes free of a security interest even if he knows that the security interest exists.
However, a buyer who knows that the underlying security agreement prohibits the
sale of the property subject to the security interest, then the buyer takes subject to
such security interest. See § 2 of the 1972 Official Comment to N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 12A:9307.
174 In order to perfect a security interest (other than a purchase money security
interest) in consumer goods, it is necessary to file a financing statement or to take
possession of the goods. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-302(1) (a) & (1) (d) (West 1962 and
Supp. 1994). It is almost inconceivable that a buyer could buy consumer goods from
a debtor where the goods were in the possession of the secured party without obtaining knowledge of the security interest. Accordingly, as a practical matter, the exception for consumer goods will only generally arise as to purchase money security
interests in consumer goods.
175 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-307(3) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
176 Id.
177 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-307(1) - (3) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
178 A "buyer in the ordinary course of business" as defined in Section 1-201(9) does
not have knowledge that his purchase violates the security interest of a third party.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 12A:1-201(9). A "buyer in the ordinary course of business" under
Section 9-307 is one who knows of the existence of the security interest, but presumably does not know that his purchase violates the security interest. N.J. STAT. ANN.
12A:9-307(1). Due to the fact that many secured parties are surprised to discover that
a purchaser who is aware of the existence of the secured party's lien can nonetheless
purchase the collateral free of such lien, such an exception is often advisable.
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After-Acquired Property § 9-108.

Almost every security agreement will include a provision pursuant to which the property of the borrower acquired after the consummation of the loan is deemed to be included in the collateral.
Borrower's counsel's opinion as to the creation of a security interest in collateral would be deemed, therefore, to include an opinion
as to the creation of a security interest in after-acquired property. 7 ' The UCC provides certain limitations upon when such after-acquired property will be subject to the security interest of the
lender.1 "0 Under Section 9-108, a secured party may take a security
interest in after-acquired property only to the extent that new value
is given."8 ' Under the statute, new value is given if the after-acquired property is obtained by the debtor either (a) in the ordinary course of business or (b) under a contract of purchase made
within a reasonable time after new value is given and permitted or
contemplated by the security agreement.1 8 2 The commentary
under Section 9-108 suggests that a secured party may not be able
to create a security interest in after-acquired property which is not
the type of property ordinarily acquired by the debtor in the
course of its business or is not acquired within a reasonable time
after new value is given.1 8 3 For this reason, an exception to the
security interest opinion as to creation is necessary to avoid rendering an inaccurate opinion when the collateral includes after-ac18 4

quired property.

2.
(a)

Perfection.
Proceeds.

Where proceeds are included in the description of the collateral or where borrower's counsel is requested to render an opinion
179

Security Interest Report, supra note 22, at 393.
§ 12A:9-108 (1962 and Supp. 1994).

180 N.J. STAT. ANN.
181 Id.

Id.
The commentary indicates that judicial construction had customarily limited
the enforceability of after-acquired property clauses to exclude property not acquired
in the ordinary course of business. While expressly stating that the statute is not intended to per se exclude such property from coverage under an after-acquired property clause, it does make clear that the section is intended to "deny present value
status to out of ordinary course acquisitions not made pursuant to the original loan
agreement." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-108, Official Comment (West 1962 and Supp.
1994).
184 The form of exception may be stated as follows: "The opinions expressed
herein are subject to the qualification that security interests in after-acquired property
are subject to the limitations set forth in section 9-108."
182
183
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that no additional filing or action is necessary to maintain the
perfection of the lender's security interest, borrower's counsel
must address issues related to the maintenance of a perfected security interest in proceeds.18 5 Security interest opinion concerns 186
as
to proceeds relate only to the perfection of the security interest.
A secured party may have to take additional action within 10 days
after the sale of the property to maintain its security interest in
proceeds. 18 7 Therefore, it is in the best interest, not only of the
borrower's counsel, but also of the lender (who may refer to and
rely upon the opinion when deciding how to proceed in certain
circumstances later), for the opinion to reference the UCC's limi188
tations on perfection of security interests in proceeds.
(b)

Continuation Filings.

Where borrower's counsel is required to offer an opinion as to
the perfection of security interests, borrower's counsel should
identify those circumstances where additional action will be required. 189 Generally, these circumstances include the expiration of
the five-year period from the date of filing of the financing state.185 To the extent that borrower's counsel's opinion relates only to matters existing
as of the date of closing, it may be argued that an exception as to the limitations set
forth in Section 9-306 is unnecessary since, as of the date of the opinion, the security
interest in any proceeds of collateral sold on that day will remain perfected. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-306(3) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994) (providing for the
continuance of perfection for 10 days from the date of sale). Such perfection, however, exists only for "identifiable" proceeds. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-306(2) (West
1962 and Supp. 1994). Furthermore, borrower's counsel's opinion could be misleading to the extent that borrower opines that the lender's security interest in the collateral, including proceeds (which contemplates future sales of the collateral), is
perfected. But see Security Interest Report, supra note 22, at 395 (suggesting that opinions as to the perfection or priority of security interests in proceeds should not be
implied).
186 The UCC expressly provides that notwithstanding the sale of the collateral, the
secured party's security interest continues to exist in not only the collateral, but also
in any identifiable proceeds of the sale. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-306(2) (West 1962
and Supp. 1994).
187 A security interest in certain proceeds (e.g., certain non-cash proceeds) may
become unperfected 10 days after the debtor receives the proceeds if the secured
party does not independently perfect its security interest in such proceeds. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:9-306(3)(c) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
188 The exception is often drafted as follows: "The opinions expressed herein are
subject to the qualification that in the case of collateral consisting of proceeds, continuation of perfection of the security interest therein is limited to the extent set forth in
Section 9-306."
189 Certain commentators recommend that the opinion contain such a qualification, but suggest that the failure to include such a qualification does not render the
opinion misleading. CaliforniaSecured TransactionsReport, supra note 3, at 817.
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ments, 190 a change in the name, identity or corporate structure of
the debtor,1 9 1 a change in the location
of the debtor' 92 or a change
193
collateral.
the
of
in the location
The need to include a qualification as to the necessity of filing
continuation statements has been questioned.1'9
Nonetheless,
lenders should not object to the inclusion of such a qualification
since it is clearly required by the UCC. One version of such a qualification may be generally stated as follows:
In order to maintain the perfection of security interests perfected by filing, continuation statements complying with the
UCC must be filed not more than six months prior to the expiration of the five-year period following the date of filing of the
financing statement, and not more than six months prior to the
expiration of each subsequent five-year period after the original
filing.
The qualifications relating to other circumstances are generally stated as follows:
We call your attention to the fact that the perfection of the...
security interests will be terminated (1) as to any collateral acquired by the Debtor more than four months after the Debtor
so changes its name, identity or corporate structure as to make
the financing statements seriously misleading, unless new approNJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-403(2) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-402(7) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-103(3)(e) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-103(1)(d), (2)(d) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
Id. Where borrower's counsel is required to opine that there are no further
filings or actions necessary to maintain the security interest, it is unclear whether failure to include a qualification (at least as to the 5 year continuation statement requirement) may render the opinion misleading. FIELD & RvAN, supra note 34, at 8-11
(expressing the opinion that such qualifications and other limitations "should be understood... whether or not expressly stated"). Support for the omission of such a
qualification is, perhaps, founded in the fact that the requirement that the lender file
continuation statements is so widely known by all commercial asset-based financiers as
to render notice in opinion letters unnecessary. Id; see also Security Interest Report, supra
note 22, at 379. Other qualifications as to changes in circumstances which would
require additional action to maintain perfection may be considered advisory in nature
and not required since, as of the date of the opinion, such circumstances have generally not arisen. Including qualifications as to such other circumstances, however, puts
the lender on notice that changes in circumstances may require further action to
maintain perfection. California Secured Transactions Report, supra note 3, at 817. The
New York Tribar Opinion Committee has suggested that where the law of the applicable jurisdiction is non-uniform, the borrower's counsel should include express exceptions to address such non-uniformity. Security Interest Report, supra note 22, at 379.
Such a requirement, however, places the burden on the opinion counsel to survey the
laws ofjurisdictions in which such counsel is not obligated to opine in order to determine whether the laws of the opining counsel's jurisdiction may be considered by the
opinion recipient(s) to be non-uniform.
190
191
192
193
194
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priate financing statements indicating the new name, identity or
corporate structure of the Debtor are properly filed before the
expiration of such four months and (2) as to any collateral consisting of accounts, general intangibles or mobile goods, four
months after the Debtor changes its chief executive offices to a
newjurisdiction outside the State (or, if earlier, when perfection
under the laws of the State would have ceased) unless such security interests are
perfected in such new jurisdiction before
19 5
that termination.

To the extent that the collateral includes money or instruments (for which possession is generally required to perfect a security interest in such items), borrower's counsel may also wish to
include the following qualification where possession of the property may not be delivered at closing:
As to any Collateral consisting of "money" or "instruments" (as
defined under the UCC), other than instruments which constitute a part of "chattel paper" (as defined under the UCC), the
perfection of a security interest therein will terminate twentyone days after such security interest attaches, unless the secured
party takes possession of such instruments.' 9 6
This qualification may be particularly relevant in situations where
the lender purports to take a security interest in all instruments
pursuant to a "lockbox" type of arrangement. If checks are mistakenly sent to the borrower, rather than to the lockbox, the lender's
security interest in such instruments may terminate unless the
lender obtains possession within 21 days.
In multiple state transactions, where the collateral consists of
goods which may be relocated in other jurisdictions or come into
New Jersey from other states, borrower's counsel should consider
including a further exception in the form stated below:
Certain additional action may be required under [New York] law
to maintain perfection of a security interest in certain1 goods
to
97
the extent provided under Section 9-103 of the UCC.

& RYAN, supra note 34, at 8-11.
& Ryan propose the following as an alternate variation of the exception:
[I] n the case of instruments (as such term is defined in Article 9 of the
UCC) not constituting part of chattel paper (as such term is defined in
Article 9 of the UCC), the security interests of the secured party therein
cannot be perfected by the filing of the financing statements but will be
[created and] perfected if possession thereof is in accordance with the
provisions of [the security agreement] [Article 9 of the UCC].
Id. at § 8.03[1].
197 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-103(1) covers circumstances in which the secured party
may have to take further action to maintain perfection of a security interest in ordinary goods which are relocated to another jurisdiction. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9195 FIELD
196 Field
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Accessions.

Where the borrower is a manufacturer or is engaged in any
business where things are assembled, the UCC provisions concerning accessions1 98 should be addressed in the borrower's counsel's
security interest opinion. Although most of the UCC provisions
addressing accessions deal with the priority of competing security
interests, 199 certain provisions deal with the validity of the security
interest 2 ° and impose limitations on the secured party's ability to
deal with the collateral. 0 1
Generally, a security interest in accessions which attaches after
the accessions are incorporated into other goods is invalid against
20 2
a person who has a preexisting security interest in the whole.
This is of particular concern where the borrower manufactures or
installs subassemblies. 20 3 Although no New Jersey court has construed the statute, in such transactions borrower's counsel is well
advised to include a qualification to his opinion as follows:
The opinions expressed herein are subject to the qualification
that in the case of collateral consisting of accessions, the validity
of the security interest and the ability of a secured party to remove its collateral from the whole is limited to the extent set
forth in Section 9-314 of the UCC.
E. Priority Opinions.
Most experienced New Jersey lawyers will not render an opinion as to the priority of security interests2 4 which are perfected by
means other than possession.20 5 Many educational materials ad103(2) addresses the action necessary to maintain a perfected security interest in
goods covered by a certificate of title which are brought into New Jersey.
198 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-314 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
199 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-314(1) & (3) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
200 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-314(2) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
201 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-314(4) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
202 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-314(2) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
203 For example, where a lender takes a security interest in the inventory of a borrower who installs computer hardware in its customers' computers, at the time of the
closing, the lender's security interest in any computer hardware already installed in
computers owned by the borrower's customers may be invalid against the holder of a
security interest in the computer.
204 LEGAL OPINIONS,

supra note 4, at 372 ("[E]xperienced lawyers often refuse to

give priority opinions on the grounds that the factual questions and legal rights relating to priority are so complex that the exceptions, qualifications, and assumptions
required to make an opinion accurate would render it of little value to the opinion
recipient.").
205 Where a security interest in identifiable instruments or certificated securities is
to be perfected by possession, it may be possible for borrower's counsel to render a
priority opinion with respect to such property. Such an opinion, however, should
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dressing such priority opinions agree that either such opinions
should not be rendered or that any such opinion, if properly given,
is subject to so many qualifications 20 6 that the cost of preparing the
opinion outweighs its value. 20 7 This is true regardless of whether
the transaction in connection with which the opinion is rendered
is a mid-market transaction or a high-end transaction. Perhaps the
most convincing reason for borrower's counsel to refuse to render
a priority opinion arises out of the existence of an unknown
number of uncommon liens which may arise by operation of law.
The Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Business Law
Section of the State Bar of California has, for example, identified
69 such security interests or liens arising solely under California
State law. 2 8 Although no authority has attempted to create a similar list of liens which may arise under New Jersey law, examples of
such liens can be found under New Jersey law.20 9 Similarly, various
include assumptions that the secured party takes possession of the collateral in New
Jersey in good faith without notice of any adverse claim thereto and retains possession
of the collateral. The secured party must take possession of the collateral in New
Jersey since, if the secured party takes possession of the collateral in another jurisdiction, New Jersey law would look to the law of the other jurisdiction to determine the
manner of perfection. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-103(1)(b) (West 1962 and Supp.
1994).
206 Even the "boilerplate" exceptions to priority opinions are numerous. See FIELD
& RYA, supra note 34, at 8-18 to 8-20; STERBA, supra note 19, at 94-99.
207 FIELD & RYA, supra note 34, at 8-13 to 8-18; LEGAL OPINIONS, supra note 4, at
409.
208 CaliforniaSecured Transactions Report, supra note 3, at 820-21 n.157.
209 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-7 (West 1988) (providing for a statutory lien on
aircraft for injuries resulting from damages caused by falling cargo); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10-23.1 If (West 1992) (providing for the superpriority of liens arising under the
Spill, Compensation and Control Act over preexisting liens); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:421 (West 1987) (landlord's lien); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-2 (West 1987) (aircraft maintenance lien); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-21 (West 1987) (artisan's lien); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 22A:44-51 (West 1987) (agister's lien); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 22A:4-158 (West 1987)
(clothing processor's lien); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:14-21 (West 1987) (wage lien); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:13-5 (West 1987) (attorney's charging lien). The attorney's charging
lien may have superpriority in certain circumstances. See Adco Service, Inc. v. Graphic
Color Plate, 137 N.J. Super. 39, 347 A.2d 549 (Law Div. 1975) (providing superpriority
over federal tax liens); Osborne v. Dunham, 16 A. 231 (1889) (providing attorney's
lien on mortgage superior to that of prior assignee). A common law attorney's retaining lien attaches to all papers, books, documents, securities, moneys and property of
the client in the possession of the attorney. Brauer v. Hotel Assoc., Inc., 40 N.J. 415,
192 A.2d 831 (1963). There are numerous other liens that arise by operation of law
under other portions of the UCC other than Article 9 and would not be uncovered by
a UCC financing statement search or other public record search. Under N.J. STAT.
ANN. 12A:9-113, liens arising in connection with the retention or reservation of title by
the seller of goods (N.J. STAT. ANN. 12A:2-410(1) (West 1962 and Supp. 1994)), the
shipment by the seller of goods under reservation (N.J. STAT. ANN. 12A:2-505 (West
1962 and Supp. 1994)), and the rejection of goods (N.J. STAT. ANN. 12A:2-711(3)
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federal laws may also create complex priority issues which make
the rendering of a priority opinion risky.2 ° Furthermore, since security interests in certain collateral may be perfected by possession
without any public filing, 1 it may be impossible or impractical for
the opining counsel to determine which of those items are in the
possession of third parties at the time that a security interest attaches. Accordingly, borrower's counsel may wish to include a
qualification to clarify that no opinion is rendered as to the priority
of any security interest or lien.
It should be noted that recent New York authority has suggested that an unqualified priority opinion may be reasonably
given where the opinion is limited to an opinion based solely upon
a review of a UCC search report and such report does not reveal
any prior filings. 2 12 Such an opinion has been referred to as a "Filing Priority Opinion."21 Although it may be possible to responsibly draft such an opinion under New Jersey law, there is at least
one peculiarity of New Jersey practice that could result in a great
degree of exposure for the opining attorney.2 4 Among other
things, a Filing Priority Opinion confirms that "a UCC search report (identifying the correct name and, if necessary, address, of the
debtor) was obtained from the appropriate filing office."21 5 In
New Jersey, a UCC search report obtained against the correct legal
name (e.g., as it appears on a certificate of incorporation) of the
(West 1962 and Supp. 1994)) do not require a security agreement, do not require
filing for perfection and are governed by Article 2, not by Article 9.
210 See, e.g.,
United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526 (1993) (holding that recorded federal tax liens have priority over other previously recorded liens in after-

acquired property).
211 Security interests in letters of credit, advices of credit, goods, instruments, negotiable documents and chattel paper may be perfected by possession without filing.
NJ. STAT. ANN. 12A:9-305 (West 1962 and Supp. 1994).
212 Security Interest Report, supra note 22, at 380-83.
213 Id. at 381.
214 The Tribar Opinion Committee indicates that non-uniform laws of the jurisdiction should be pointed out. Id. at 379 n.61, 386 n.74, 388 n.77. Under this approach,
the opinion giver is responsible to review the differences between the version of the
Uniform Commercial Code adopted in the opinion giver's jursidiction and the "uniform" version of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. Although there have been three
'uniform" versions of the Uniform Commercial Code (1962, 1972 and 1977), all
states, except Vermont and Louisiana, have adopted the 1977 versions. ID PETER F.
COOGAN, ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3-6

(Supp. 1993). Further revisions to Article 9, however, are scheduled to be released
for adoption by the states in 1995 or 1996. BARLuEv CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC A-3 (1993). As these revisions are adopted by certain

states and not others, it is unclear which "uniform" version of Article 9 the opinion
giver should use for comparison.
215 Securiy Interest Report, supra note 22, at 381.
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debtor may not be sufficient to reveal all financing statements filed
against the debtor. Currently, the software used by the NewJersey
Secretary of State to search for financing statements does not use
the complex and expansive boolean logic that is familiar to many
attorneys who use CD-Rom search software or the Westlaw® or
Lexis® on-line database services. Instead, the algorithms contained in the software used by the New Jersey Secretary of State
search by word roots. 2 16 Furthermore, there is case law in other

jurisdictions that suggests that the secured party is responsible for
understanding the limitations of the filing office's search
software.2 17 This would suggest that the debtor's attorney is also
responsible for such an understanding. Accordingly, the attorney
rendering such an opinion is potentially liable if the attorney did
not predict all of the variations on the debtor's name against which
other secured parties may have filed.21 8
The New York Tribar Opinion Committee suggests that in jurisdictions that will only fill search requests against a non-corporate
debtor at a single address, ordering separate reports for each possible address of such debtor may pose "insurmountable practical
problems. "219 In most cases, it will be impossible to determine all
of the potential variations and abbreviations of a debtor's name.
Even in cases where such a determination is possible, it will likely
216 For example, a search of "Abbott Distributing, Inc." would not necessarily reveal
financing statements identifying the debtor by the names "Abott," "Abbot," or "Abot".
Nor would the search reveal financing statements which abbreviated the word "Distributing." For example, such a search would not necessarily reveal financing statements filed against "Abbott Dist., Inc." or "Abbott Distrib., Inc."
217 In re Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc., 156 B.R. 300, affd 159 B.R. 948 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1993).
218 The In re Thriftway court stated:
(The prior creditor's] filing was easily retrievable with a minimally expanded search based upon Thriftway's own legal name. Given the commercial reality that financing agreements may be misfiled or misnamed,
despite all best efforts, a searcher should be required to at least take
advantage of the flexibility offered by a computer system to find all potential filings with similar names.
In re Thrifway, 159 B.R.at 953.
219 Security Interest Report, supra note 22, at 381. Although the New Jersey Secretary
of State will require the inclusion of an address in order to fill a search request at the
state level, New Jersey is not a jurisdiction which is currently subject to such a problem. Secretary of State search reports are divided into two sections. The first section
identifies financing statements filed against debtors with a name and address identical
to the one being searched. The second section identifies financing statements filed
against debtors with similar names or the same name but a different address. The
address is used to determine what part of the search report on which a filed statement
revealed by the search will be disclosed.
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be too costly22° and time consuming to run searches against each
such variation and abbreviation.
It remains to be seen how widely accepted Filing Priority Opinions become in New Jersey. It is clear, however, that New Jersey
attorneys attempting to render Filing Priority Opinions will be well
advised to at least expressly disclose the names searched,221 include
an exception for other filings that may be revealed by other variations of names searched 222 and also disclose the fact that the opinion covers only liens revealed of record by the UCC search and
does not address other liens that may exist and have priority by
operation of law.

3

IV.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to address issues that are of particular concern to New Jersey attorneys and loan officers. It should
also provide a basis for discussion of the business needs and legal
risks involved in New Jersey's opinion letter practice. While there
are certain exceptions and opinions that can be identified as customary, there is also a great degree of variation in the practical
experience of individual attorneys and lenders. There is currently
a schism in New Jersey between attorneys who adhere to the more
detailed and defensive approach to opinion letters and those who
adhere to an approach which presumes that the opining attorney's
responsibility should be limited to those laws fundamentally affecting the enforceability of commercial loans generally. As a result of
this division, both attorneys and lenders struggle with the role of
opinion letters in commercial loan transactions. Attorneys struggle
with the risks associated with rendering opinions and including or
excluding certain exceptions to their opinions. Lenders struggle
with the meaning of opinions and whether there is a business need
to obtain certain opinions. Only a more formal consensus of understanding among New Jersey attorneys will provide a common
standard for interpretation of opinions and establish generally accepted due diligence procedures for each opinion.
220 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. The search fee for an expedited
return on a state UCC search is $35.00. Using the example of a search against a
debtor named Abbott Distributing, Inc., a comprehensive search would include all
four spelling variations of "Abbott" (i.e., Abbott, Abbot, Abott and Abot) in combination with at least two variations of "Distributing" (i.e., Dist. and Dst.). In this case,
eight separate searches would have to be ordered at a total cost of $280.
221 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
223 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.

